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Summary 
 
Although the dystopian thought has been present in the literary tradition of the Western 
civilization for over two thousand years, not until the second half of the nineteenth century did 
the dystopian literature become recognized as a significant cultural force. The horrors brought 
about by the developments of the first half of the twentieth century have additionally reinforced 
the dystopian perspective on the humankind’s potential and have led to the recognition of the 
dystopian literature as a separate literary genre. The authors of the dystopian fiction challenge 
the optimism contained in the utopian thought and critically examine the political and social 
practices of the real-world societies, undertaking thus the role of social critics. In A Clockwork 
Orange and The Wanting Seed, Anthony Burgess focuses on the shortcomings of the present-day 
society, in order to investigate the nature of the relationship between the individual and the 
society. Insights into this subject matter provided by some of the most influential social critics of 
the modern times, such as F. Nietzsche, S. Freud, and M. Foucault, only reinforce Burgess’ own 
findings: the society is fundamentally hostile to the individual, since it will resort to any means 
necessary in order to ensure a predictable and controlled functioning of the societal life. In order 
to ensure that the citizens will make only those choices that coincide with the common good, the 
society employs mechanisms of mind manipulation intended to deprive the citizens of their free 
will. In this collision between the individual and the society, Burgess stands in defence of the 
individual.       
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free will, mind manipulation 
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Introduction 
 
 We owe the word utopia to Sir Thomas More, who coined it in 1516. More used the term 
to name a fictional island with an ideal political system depicted in his book Libellus uere aureus 
nec minus salutaris quam festiuus de optimo reip. stat, deque noua Insula Vtopia (Concerning 
the Best State of a Commonwealth and the New Island of Utopia), which came to be known 
simply as Utopia. While the word utopia is generally interpreted as outopos (οὐ + τόπος; not + 
place), denoting a non-existent place, More actually combined two words that in Greek sound 
alike, outopos and eutopos. In the poem ‘Six Lines on the Island of Utopia’, More refers to 
Utopia as Eutopia, a place where all is well (εὖ + τόπος; good, well + place), using the play of 
words to suggest that a perfect place with an ideal society is nowhere to be found. Because of 
More’s pun on the two meanings, outopos and eutopos, scholars cannot agree whether literary 
utopia should be defined as depicting a non-existent place, or a non-existent ideal place. Written 
in Latin, the book was soon translated into German (1524), Italian (1548), French (1550), 
English (1551), and Dutch (1553). Subsequently, the word utopia entered Western languages and 
became a standard usage. 
 Sir Thomas More coined the word utopia and wrote the novel from which the entire 
genre would develop. Nevertheless, he was hardly the first one to envision a prospect of a society 
more desirable than the existing one, and to describe it in a form of a literary work. The concept 
of utopia and its representations in literature have been present for over two thousand years and 
can easily be found throughout the entire literary tradition of the Western culture, starting from 
the ancient Greece. Most commonly recognized as the first and the most important utopian 
writing of the classical world is Plato’s Republic (Politeia), written around 380 BC, a typical 
Platonic dialogue belonging to his early-to-middle period. In this dialogue, through a set of 
questions put forward by Socrates, Plato aspires to determine the nature of a just man and the 
workings of an ideal society. He uses the city-state (polis) as a large-scale picture of the soul. 
The ideal society described by Plato consists of three classes, each corresponding to one of the 
three fundamental elements of the soul. These classes are the philosopher-kings (wisdom), the 
warriors (courage), and the producers (moderation). All individuals in this well-reigned city-state 
are to be fitted into the profession that suits them the best: the philosopher-king is to create just 
5 
 
laws, the warriors are to make sure the laws are carried out, and producers are to provide for the 
society’s basic needs. As a result, everyone is supposed to be happy and the society is supposed 
be just. 
 With The Republic, Plato set a pattern which has been followed by succeeding utopian 
writers to the present day. In fact, there is a lot of Plato in More’s work as well, which can, for 
the most part, be attributed to More’s close friendship with the Dutch philosopher Desiderius 
Erasmus, a central figure of Northern humanism. Humanists were inspired by philosophers and 
writers of the ancient Greece and Rome and called for the revival of that tradition. Influenced by 
Humanists’ ideals, Sir Thomas More too turned to Plato in search of inspiration, primarily 
referencing Plato’s Republic and Laws in Utopia. In this respect, More’s Utopia is both the 
product of More’s and the Greek civilization.  
 The society that More describes in his Utopia is authoritarian, hierarchical, and 
patriarchal, with stern laws and ruthless punishments for those who disobey it. Such society can 
hardly seem like a perfect one for a twenty-first century reader. Nevertheless, the society of 
Utopia provides a much better life for its citizens than More’s society did. In Utopia no one is 
rich or poor, everyone is working and sharing equally, living simply and happily, with their 
demands reduced to minimum. For these reasons, to a sixteenth century reader Utopia did seem 
like a paradise.  
 Today best known as one of the major representatives of the literary utopia, Utopia is far 
from being a one-dimensional reading, offering a single interpretation. On the contrary, as 
Lyman Tower Sargent points out, various interpreters have assigned Utopia ‘radically different 
positions, from traditional Roman Catholicism to British imperialism to Marxism’ (22). 
Sargent’s explanation for this is that Utopia only seems to be straightforward on the surface, but 
in fact is quite satirical when interpreted correctly. According to him, the generations of readers 
have failed to recognize its complexity by not reading Utopia in Latin. The original Utopia has 
many puns in Latin, starting with the narrator’s name, Raphael Hythlodaeus. His first name 
means ‘healer from God’, while his last name means ‘speaker of non-sense’, which makes it 
difficult for the reader to decide whether the narrator is to be trusted or not. In a similar manner, 
Sargent continues, the names Utopia, Anydrus, Amaurotum, and Ademus are satirical as they 
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denote the island that is nowhere, the city that is a phantom, the river that has no water, and a 
ruler that has no people (23).  
 Although Politeia and Utopia are both written in the form of a dialogue, they differ 
greatly in many respects. While More’s society is based on egalitarianism, in Plato’s society 
egalitarianism exists only within the clear-cut classes into which the society is divided. More’s 
family structures are quite traditional, with the household as the smallest social unit. In contrast, 
Plato advocates abolition of the family, proposing that all women should be shared by all the 
men, and that all children should be raised by the whole community. The discrepancy between 
how Plato and More envisioned an ideal society is consistent throughout the genre. The variety 
found among the literary works classified as utopian goes to such an extent that defining the 
genre of literary utopia becomes a very difficult task indeed. The diversity in question can be 
attributed to the fact that a utopian work is always a response to a specific historical setting. An 
ideal society is always imagined in relation to the existing one, primarily its ills and injustices. 
Accordingly, utopias are shaped specifically at times of crisis when political or social changes 
are called for. For example, Plato wrote Politeia as a reaction to the disastrous state of legislation 
and the decline of the traditional moral values in the old Greek polis, which was conditioned by 
the long years of Peloponnesian wars. Plato’s disappointment was primarily induced by the 
injustice inflicted on Socrates, the man whom Plato regarded as the most just man of his time; 
Socrates’ death sentence had led Plato to pose the question of how life in polis could be changed 
for the better. More’s Utopia, written during quite a tumultuous times as well, was an expression 
of More’s discontent with the tensions and the corruption that pervaded the society of the early 
sixteenth century England.  
 As utopia represents a political and social alternative to the existing society of the 
author’s own time, utopias inevitably differ from one another depending on aspects such as the 
historical circumstances within which a literary work is created, as well as the author’s own 
position within these circumstances, that is, his/her social status and personal inclinations. One 
has to bear in mind that while all utopian authors strive to attain the same end, to propose what 
constitutes an ideal society, utopian visions still differ from one another in as to what the 
postulated perfection is. L. T. Sargent comments on this diversity as follows: 
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 Utopias have been written from every conceivable position: There are socialist, capitalist, 
 monarchical, democratic, anarchist, ecological, feminist, patriarchal, egalitarian, 
 hierarchical, racialist, left-wing, right-wing, reformist, free love, nuclear family, extended 
 family, gay, lesbian, and many more utopias, and all these types were published between 
 1516 and middle of the 20th century, before diversity  really took hold. (21) 
However, what all these different works have in common is that they reflect the key issues of the 
period in which their authors lived. As Sargent notes, while most of these issues are recurrent – 
law and order, religious belief and practice, economic relations, authority, upbringing and 
education – their magnitude varies depending on the period in which utopias were written (21). 
 The lack of distinction between utopia as a literary genre and utopianism as a general 
category also makes the genre difficult to define. The idea of utopianism is in its common usage 
often assigned with derogatory connotations. In the common everyday usage, utopianism is 
related with something imaginary, illusionary, impossible and idealistic. Even the dictionaries 
often succumb to such common usage and define utopianism as ‘a strong belief that everything 
can be perfect, often in a way that does not seem to be realistic or practical’ (Oxford Dictionary 
7th edition). Contrary to such common usage of the term, utopian scholars see utopia as a 
legitimate means of articulating humankind’s omnipresent and everlasting aspiration for a better 
world. For that reason, Sargent defines utopianism as ‘social dreaming’ (5). Within this broad 
category of utopianism one can differentiate between literary utopia, utopian practice, and 
utopian social theory.1 
 According to the Dictionary of Literary Terms and Motifs, it is generally accepted among 
scholars that three major characteristics distinguish utopia from other literary forms: ‘a utopia is 
fictional, it deals with a specific unit of society, and its basic theme is the political framework of 
that unit. Utopias vary in the degree of attention paid to each of these characteristics, but the 
work that does not pay some attention to all three is probably peripheral to the genre’ (2: 1351). 
Regarding the purpose of utopian fiction, Sargent distinguishes at least six of them: ‘it can be a 
                                                          
1 L. T. Sargent provides a further explication of these terms: utopian practice refers to intentional communities or 
communes; utopian social theory includes: using utopia as a means of analysis, exploring utopia in relation to 
ideology as in work of Karl Mannheim, using utopia to explain social change as in work of Ernst Bloch, exploring 
the role of utopianism in colonialism and post-colonialism, as well as in the debate on globalization and anti 
globalization, and so on, p. 7 
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mere fantasy, it can be a description of a desirable or undesirable place, an extrapolation, a 
warning, an alternative to the present, or a model to be achieved’ (8).  
 The greatest disagreement in defining the literary utopia stems from More’s pun on the 
meanings outopos (non-existent place) and eutopos (non-existent good place). As a result, two 
fundamentally different definitions of literary utopia are used by the contemporary scholars. The 
first definition is provided by Darko Suvin: 
 Utopia is the verbal construction of a particular quasi-human community where socio-
 political institutions, norms, and individual relationships are organized according to a 
 more perfect principle than in the author’s community, this construction being based on 
 estrangement arising out of an alternative historical hypothesis. (qtd. in Sargent 6)   
Suvin perceives utopia strictly as eutopos, as does another prominent contemporary utopian 
scholar, Krishan Kumar. Tom Moylan reports that Kumar, in Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern 
Times (1988), limits the term to a literary genre of fictional depictions of perfect societies 
exclusively (129). The second definition is provided by L. T. Sargent: 
 A non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and 
 space. In standard usage utopia is used both as defined here and as an equivalent for 
 eutopia or non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in 
 time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as a 
 considerably better than the society in which that reader lived. (6) 
Sargent sees utopia as a broader category, as outopos, with two possible modes: eutopia as the 
result of envisioning the humankind’s future with hope and dystopia as the result of envisioning 
the humankind’s future with fear (8).  
 The word dystopia (Greek: δυσ + τόπος; bad, ill + place) denotes a non-existent bad 
place. The imaginative dystopian society, which according to Karl Meyer, ‘serves only as a lens 
through which every barbarity of our age is magnified’ (qtd. in The Dictionary of Literary Terms 
and Motifs 1: 421), has also been referred to as futopia (future and futile) by K. Meyer, cacotopia 
(κακόs + τόπος; bad + place) by Lewis Mumford, negative utopia by Erich Fromm, or, by many, 
simply anti-utopia. However, the commonly accepted term for scholarly uses became dystopia. 
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According to The New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, the word was coined in 1868 by John 
Stuart Mill, who used it in a speech given before the British House of Commons (2: 607).  
 Literary dystopia is defined in relation to utopia; hence, depending on whether utopia is 
understood as eutopos or outopos, dystopia is to be understood as either a separate genre or a 
subgenre of utopia. Given that in contemporary literature dystopia is not only a genre separate 
from utopia, but also the dominant of the two genres, Suvin’s definition will be accepted for the 
purpose of this paper, as it allows for understanding dystopia as utopia’s equal counterpart. 
Therefore, the term utopia will be used from this point on as denoting eutopos. 
 A feature undoubtedly common to all utopias is that they describe an ideal society, one of 
fulfilment of humankind’s hopes and undisturbed happiness. Such works include a firm faith in 
humankind’s abilities, as well as certain optimism that people can better themselves and that a 
perfect society ultimately can be accomplished. Since this type of optimism is characteristic for 
the Age of the Enlightenment, M. Keith Booker concludes that in its modern formulation utopia 
is often seen as an Enlightenment related phenomenon (Literature 34). 
 The Enlightenment movement was intended to enable the humankind to take its destiny 
into its own hands. Kant saw the Enlightenment as ‘man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity’ (An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? 1). This intended liberation of 
humankind was based upon a strong confidence in reason and science. The new science brought 
about new possibilities and encouraged belief in the infinite advancement of knowledge and 
progress towards both social and moral improvement. Science was believed to have the potential 
needed to build a better world. Booker notes that the rise of science in the Age of Enlightenment 
led to an explosion in utopian thought as well (Literature 5). The meta-narrative produced by the 
Enlightenment movement, that would function as an authority discourse, was the dogma of the 
humankind’s continuous emancipation. The dogma in question goes perfectly hand in hand with 
the notion of utopia, which relies on the premise that continuing improvement of humankind is 
possible and that it will eventually lead to acquiring perfection. The idea of humankind’s 
continuous betterment, which can be found at the very foundation of both the Enlightenment 
movement and the utopian thought, was based upon history being perceived as a teleological, 
unitary process. However, it is precisely such understanding of history that became subjected to 
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constant criticism by many thinkers of the twentieth century, who have revealed the ideological 
character of such concept of history. Walter Benjamin, for example, suggests that there is no 
such thing as a unique and single history, only a certain view of the past, constructed by the 
dominant social groups in such a way that enables them to remain in power. In 1938 in his work 
Theses on the Philosophy of History Benjamin, influenced by Nietzsche and Marx, argues that 
history is made up of images of the past offered from different perspectives, without there being 
a single perspective that could unify all the others; for Benjamin, history is history of the 
winners. By the second half of the nineteenth century, various thinkers began questioning the 
notion of history as a smooth and continuous narrative. In The Transparent Society (1992), 
Gianni Vattimo asserts a correlation between the crisis of the idea of history and the crisis of the 
idea of progress: the Enlightenment dogma of continuous emancipation, progressing towards the 
form of the modern European man as the postulated perfection, could no longer function when it 
became impossible to perceive history as a unilinear process. The European ideal of man was 
exposed as just one among many ideals. European modern science, once perceived as the 
backbone of humankind’s progress and improvement, as liberating, was now exposed as 
enslaving, as it proved to be the driving force of the European imperialism: 
 By the nineteenth century many of the technological achievements predicted by early 
 scientists like Bacon were being realized, but many of these achievements already offered 
 hints that science would not have an entirely emancipatory effect on humanity. Most 
 obviously, the  technological advances made possible by the evolution of science 
 contributed to an industrial revolution in Western Europe that made worldwide 
 imperialism a practical reality even as it proved to be anything but liberating for the 
 masses of exploited European workers who suddenly found themselves harnessed to 
 machines in the service of industry. (Booker, Impulse 6) 
As pointed out by the very first critic of the Enlightenment movement, Friedrich W. Nietzsche, 
since its beginnings, the Enlightenment movement contained seeds of doubt about the 
irreproachability of the founding principles it had produced, and an inherent inconsistency that 
would eventually lead to the collapse of the whole movement. The trouble with the optimism of 
the Enlightenment was that it had failed to acknowledge the fact that humans are rooted in the 
world of natural beings, and are capable of far more than the optimism of the Enlightenment 
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movement would give them credit for. The events of the first half of the twentieth century – ‘the 
threat of nuclear extinction; the rise of the modern totalitarian state; the ecological crisis; the 
often questionable benefits of technological and social innovations’ – reflected that dark side of 
human nature that the Enlightenment thought chose to overlook (Dictionary of Literary Terms 
and Motifs 1: 421). However, the turning point that had led to the change from the optimism 
introduced by the Enlightenment to the pessimism of the Modernism, and later even more of the 
Postmodernism, is for many the World War II, which took place so soon after World War I, 
often regarded as the war that would stop all wars. According to Jean-François Lyotard, the 
Enlightenment dogma of the emancipation of humankind was simply no longer possible after 
horrors such as Auschwitz, a one of a kind historical rupture in humanism (The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 1979). 
 Due to these events, it became easier for many to imagine a future much gloomier than 
that proposed by utopian authors. During the course of the nineteenth century dystopian thought 
became more recognized as ‘an important and identifiable cultural force’ (Booker, Literature 5). 
Booker notes that by the second half of the twentieth century the prevailing mood to be found in 
social criticism and literature alike, was that of a widespread pessimism, and a distrust in the 
possibility of achieving the utopian dream. He concludes that for a modern sceptic it became 
‘much easier to visualize nightmares than dreams of the future’ (Impulse 15). 
 Although the dystopian fiction did not develop into a separate literary genre until the 
twentieth century, literary works voicing a distinctive dystopian energy can be traced back to the 
time of ancient Greece, the period in which the first utopian writings appeared as well. The first 
dystopian texts are considered to be plays written by Aristophanes, a comedy writer, who wrote 
satirical responses (Ecclesiazusae or Women in Parliament, 392 BC; Plutus or Wealth, 388 BC) 
to utopian writings of his time, primarily Plato’s works. In a similar manner, Jonathan Swift 
intended the third book of Gulliver's Travels (fully titled Travels into Several Remote Nations of 
the World, 1726) as a satirical reaction to Francis Bacon’s utopia New Atlantis (1627). 
Description of the dystopian society is to be found in Swift’s portrayal of the flying city of 
Laputa, inhabited solely by scientists who seek knowledge that is obviously futile, as they are 
physically cut off from the land and do not have any desire or opportunity to apply the acquired 
knowledge. B. F. Skinner’s Walden Two (1948), a utopian novel that describes a small planned 
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community based on the principles of the behavioural psychology, was intended by its author to 
be a guidebook to establishing an ideal community. Still, some saw it as a depiction of a 
totalitarian society, and an incentive to provide a dystopian response, as did Anthony Burgess, 
who as a result wrote A Clockwork Orange (1962). Examples are many, and they all testify to the 
fact that dystopian fiction is as a rule a reaction to utopian fiction. As there can be fundamental 
disagreements regarding what constitutes a good or a bad place, whether a literary work is 
deemed utopian or dystopian is often only a matter of the point of view: 
 Dystopia is utopia’s polarized mirror image. While utilizing many of the same concepts 
 as utopia – for example, social stability created by authoritarian regimentation – dystopia 
 reads these ideas pessimistically. Dystopia angrily challenges utopia’s fundamental 
 assumption of human perfectibility, arguing that humanity’s inherent flaws negate the 
 possibility of constructing perfect societies, except for those that are perfectly hellish. 
 (New Dictionary of the History of Ideas 2: 606) 
According to the Dictionary of Literary Terms and Motifs, literary dystopias generally express 
their authors’ disappointment in the promises made by various utopian programs, as well as a 
concern that, in the name of progress, human condition could be reduced to an absurd existence 
(1: 422). The condition of a society depicted in dystopian fiction is a consequence of that 
society’s leaders’ attempt to implement a utopian scheme. Such efforts, if they lead to success, 
do so at the cost of dehumanizing citizens. In this respect, the authors of dystopian fiction are 
most commonly anti-utopian: they believe that even if perfection of a utopia can be achieved, it 
would be at the cost of diminishing those qualities that constitute a human being – ‘creativity, 
courage, humility, righteous anger, charity, perseverance . . . for these root only in the imperfect 
man in the imperfect world’ (Dictionary of Literary Terms and Motifs 1: 422). A perfect world 
of human beings reduced to ‘perfect’ mechanical toys turns out to be a dystopia rather than a 
utopia.  
 During the nineteenth century utopianism reached its peak.  As utopian authors of this 
period based their blueprints for perfecting the society greatly on science and technology, a 
recurrent theme to be found in dystopian fiction of that period is accordingly a distrust and 
animosity to science, which stems from a sobering realization that by conquering nature, science 
is conquering humankind as well. This hostility is not directed towards scientists or scientific 
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discoveries, but towards the failure of scientifically based utopias to comprehend and respect the 
human nature. Dystopian authors, who perceive technology as a source of anxiety, refute the 
common utopian dream of a golden age in which science and technology will ease humankind’s 
life (Dictionary of Literary Terms and Motifs 1: 424). Dystopias show that humankind’s 
obsession with progress actually leads to the dangerous terrain:  
 Generally speaking, man's reckless, hubristic, and ignorant pursuit of progress is the 
 founder of most dystopias. Writers of dystopian fiction seem to be saying that if man can 
 do something preposterous and hurtful to himself he will likely do it; they warn us to 
 pause before the treacherous terrain of innovation and resolve which paths must not be 
 taken, what deeds must not be done. (Dictionary of Literary Terms and Motifs 1: 429)  
While during the nineteenth century literary utopia peaked at its popularity, at the turn of the 
century, ‘as the proud confidence of the nineteenth century crumbled when faced with the 
horrors of the twentieth’ (New Dictionary of the History of Ideas 2: 607), the utopian impulse 
weakened immensely. At the same time, utopia’s gloomy counterpart, the dystopian fiction, 
began developing into a separate literary genre. The most influential dystopian works were 
written during the first half of the twentieth century: Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1920), Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), and George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945) and Nineteen 
Eighty-four (1949). These four works have reinforced the dystopian genre as being independent 
from utopia. During the course of the second half of the twentieth century, events such as the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and the threat of nuclear extinction, have ‘lent 
strength and scope to the development of dystopian fiction, as horrific events and movements 
rendered the utopian ideal increasingly absurd and made it possible for dystopias to posit terrible 
fictive societies’ (New Dictionary of the History of Ideas 2: 608). The dystopian fiction, during 
the second half of the twentieth century, ultimately emerged as the dominant out of the two 
genres. 
 
 
 
14 
 
1. Dystopian literature as a form of social criticism 
 
 In Dystopian Literature: A Theory and a Research Guide, M. Keith Booker provides a 
valuable argumentation in support of understanding dystopian literature as primarily a form of 
social criticism. He begins his explication by asserting that imaginative literature is a great asset 
to humankind: it enables us to see reality in new ways, always from a fresh and different 
perspective. Literature offers imaginative visions of the society, to which we can contrast the 
existent society and its ills, both actual and potential ones. For that reason,  imaginative literature 
represents ‘the most important means by which any culture can investigate new ways of defining 
itself and of exploring alternatives to the social and political status quo’ (Booker, Literature 3). 
Such project is most obviously epitomized by utopian literature, which is by definition in a 
constant search for an ideal society. Since dystopian literature is as a rule a reaction to utopian 
thought, it necessarily includes a dialogue with the idealism present in utopian literature. 
Therefore, Booker concludes that dystopian literature is the embodiment of a project that 
critically examines both the actual condition and the possible abuses that might result from 
attempting to implement a utopian alternative. In other words, dystopian literature is ‘the 
epitome of literature in its role as social criticism’ (Literature 3):  
 Briefly, dystopian literature is specifically that literature which situates itself in direct 
 opposition to utopian thought, warning against the potential negative consequences of 
 arrant utopianism. At the same time, dystopian literature generally also constitutes a 
 critique of existing social conditions or political systems, either through the critical 
 examination of the utopian premises upon which those conditions and systems are based 
 or through the imaginative extension of those conditions and systems into different 
 contexts that more clearly reveal their flaws and contradictions. (Literature 3) 
Booker establishes a kinship between the social criticism present in dystopian literature and the 
criticism found in the works of modern social and cultural critics, such as Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Mikhail Bakhtin, Louis 
Althusser and Michel Foucault. He relates this accordance between the trends in literature and 
social criticism in their joint origins: both developed as a reaction to the omnipresent pessimism 
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regarding the prospect of achieving the perfect society. Booker references other prominent 
dystopian scholars in support of his reasoning. Robert C. Elliott likewise asserts that the 
developments of the twentieth century have caused a widespread distrust of utopian thought: ‘To 
believe in utopia one must have faith of a kind that our history has made nearly inaccessible. 
This is one major form of the crisis of faith under which Western culture reels’ (qtd. in Booker, 
Impulse 15). Mark Hillegas as well finds the modern turn to literary visions of ‘the future as 
nightmare’ to be ‘one of the most revealing indexes to the anxieties of our age’ (qtd. in Booker, 
Impulse 15).  
 Although the modern social critics and dystopian authors investigate the same specific 
concerns of real-world societies, they differ in their approach to the subject matter. The 
advantage of the dystopian fiction lies in its ‘ability to illuminate social and political issues from 
an angle not available to conventional social theorists and critics’ (Booker, Impulse 174). Booker 
explicates this advantage as follows: ‘By focusing their critiques of society on imaginatively 
distant settings, dystopian fictions provide fresh perspectives on problematic social and political 
practices that might otherwise be taken for granted or considered natural and inevitable’ 
(Literature 4). According to Booker, such defamiliarization is the principal technique of 
dystopian literature.  
 In his dystopian novels, Anthony Burgess too employs the technique of defamiliarization 
– although set in the future, A Clockwork Orange (1962) and The Wanting Seed (1962) represent 
‘extensions of present conditions rather than forecasts of future ones’ (Morris 56). The observed 
shortcomings of the real-world society were an incentive for Burgess to write his dystopian 
novels, in which he investigates the nature of the relationship between the society and the 
individual. Burgess’ protagonists are strong distinctive individuals who attempt to exercise one 
of the most basic human rights, that of free choice. However, individual liberty is exposed in 
these works as a mere illusion created by the society in order to ensure that the individuals 
conduct themselves appropriately within the dictates of societal demands. Burgess warns against 
the dangers entailed in society’s willingness to sacrifice the rights of an individual for the benefit 
of the social body as a whole: an individual that is deprived of the freedom of choice ceases to be 
human; such an individual is reduced to a predictable mechanical toy.  
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 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and Michel Foucault, each from a different 
perspective and within a different context, entertained the same issue, analysing the mechanisms 
that society employs in order to govern its members more easily. Since both the authors of 
dystopian fiction and the modern social critics address the same issues observed in existing 
social and political systems, Booker concludes that ‘an awareness of the work of such critics is 
extremely useful for gaining an understanding of the issues at stake in modern dystopian 
literature’ (Literature 11). A similar viewpoint can be inferred from Burgess’ comment on the 
literary allusiveness present in his works: ‘Any book has behind it all the books that have been 
written. The author’s aware of them; the reader ought to be aware, too’ (The Art of Fiction 2). 
Following such reasoning, this paper will highlight those themes found in Burgess’ A Clockwork 
Orange and The Wanting Seed that have been entertained by the modern social critics as well. 
 The central concern in both A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed is the conflict 
between individual freedom and social obedience. Burgess criticizes the tendency of the society 
to overlook the individual rights and liberties for the sake of the common good. Such criticism 
strongly resonates with Nietzsche’s reflections on the matter. Advocating strong individualism 
throughout his opus, Nietzsche stresses repeatedly that the society should not exist for the sake of 
the common good but for the sake of the individual: 
 One must renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree with many people. ‘Good’ is no
 longer good when one’s neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a 
 ‘common good’! The expression contradicts itself; that which can be common is always 
 of small value. In the end things must be as they are and have always been—the great 
 things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the 
 refined, and, to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare. (Beyond Good and Evil 67) 
As a part of his ‘all-out assault’ on the entire tradition of the Western civilization, Nietzsche 
rejects its fundamental underlying rationale, the notion of linear history. The Judeo-Christian 
tradition, the Enlightenment movement, and the modern science – the traditions that have shaped 
the present-day society the most – draw their utopian optimism regarding the prospects of 
humankind’s progress precisely from such understanding of history. As an alternative, Nietzsche 
proposes a cyclical understanding of history as eternal recurrence. In his dystopian works, 
Burgess as well entertains the notion of cyclical history. The model envisioned by Burgess, 
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consisting of three phases engaged in a ‘perpetual waltz’, has several functions. Firstly, it 
provides the structure for A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed. Secondly, it enables 
Burgess to refute the utopian dream of achieving the perfect society and to reinforce dystopian 
pessimism according to which progress of the humankind is impossible. 
 According to Burgess, society is constantly in search of a way ‘to destroy the self’ in 
order to ‘save man’ (Aggeler 184), which makes it fundamentally inimical to the individual. 
Freud’s reflections on the matter led him to reach the same conclusion. Finding the discrepancy 
between the individual desire and social demand to be insurmountable, Freud asserts that no 
reform of social institutions or conventions could ever lead to individual’s happiness, since the 
society is not interested in providing happiness for the individual, but security for the entire 
social body. Foucault as well explores the animosity displayed by the society towards the 
individual. Concluding that the present-day society is essentially carceral, Foucault asserts that 
the purpose of the constant surveillance, which all the citizens are subjected to, is to identify 
those who diverge from the official norm in order to marginalize them and thus provide a group 
against which the society can define itself. 
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2. The issues of the contemporary society addressed in Burgess’ dystopias 
  
 In the second part of his autobiography, You’ve Had Your Time (1990), Burgess explains 
that the incentive to write A Clockwork Orange was a new phenomenon he encountered upon 
repatriating to Great Britain – the violence of adolescent gangs, which he had a chance to witness 
first-hand when he and his wife Lynne, during a trip to Hastings, saw Mods and Rockers, two 
conflicting youth gangs, ‘knocking hell out of each other’ (26). Burgess recognized in these 
youths a love of aggression for its own sake, predicting correctly that ‘the Queen’s Peace was 
going to be greatly disrupted by the aimless energy of these new young, well-fed with money in 
their pockets’ (You’ve Had Your Time 26). The Mods and the Rockers were seen as such a 
serious threat to the modern British state that a British politician put forward a proposal 
suggesting that the troublemaking youths should be conditioned to be good. Such standpoint 
infuriated Burgess and led him to write a novel that would pose an existential dilemma: ‘is it 
better for an individual to choose to be bad than to be conditioned to be good’ (Morrison viii).   
 In regard to the moral dilemma that A Clockwork Orange poses, the novel is to be 
understood as an indirect response to B. F. Skinner’s utopian work Walden Two (1948). Skinner, 
an American psychologist, who, after having carried out experiments on behavioural 
modifications in animals, believed the same was possible with human subjects. He noted that 
through such conditioning it would be possible to ‘achieve a sort of control under which the 
controlled, though they are following a code much more scrupulously than was ever the case 
under the old system, now feel free’ (qtd. in Morrison xxii). While claiming that the society he 
proposes in Walden Two is intended for the humankind, Skinner makes it clear that the 
humankind is to be redesigned in order to fit the society he had envisioned. Such scientific 
manipulation of the individual necessarily implies abolishing the notion of a human being as an 
autonomous and free agent. Alarming as Skinner’s ideas might have been for Burgess, an even 
greater source of agitation for Burgess were accounts of new behaviourist methods of reforming 
criminals used in American prisons, intended to limit their freedom of choice to what society 
deemed good (Aggeler 170). British politicians were considering using those same methods as a 
means of dealing with the rise of violence of the British youths. Burgess warns us that ‘once a 
society knowingly permits the dehumanizing use of one human being to achieve an end, it has 
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effectively set in motion a process that must eventually involve all of its members’ (Aggeler 
180). Believing that ‘it is better to have our streets infested with murderous young hoodlums than 
to deny individual freedom of choice’ (qtd. in Booker, Literature 95), Burgess intended his new 
novel to be an affirmation of free will.  
 The title of the novel is taken from a piece of slang, ‘as queer as a clockwork orange’, a 
Cockney expression meaning as queer as possible. Burgess recognized the potential of the 
expression, feeling that there was a meaning deeper in it than a metaphor of queerness, and 
decided to use it as a title for a novel, when appropriate story comes along. As it turned out, he 
had to wait for almost twenty years for that to happen. In his essay ‘Clockwork Marmalade’, 
Burgess elaborates on the matter: 
 In 1945, back from the army, I heard an 80-year-old Cockney in a London pub say that 
 somebody was ‘as queer as a clockwork orange’. The ‘queer’ did not mean homosexual: 
 it meant mad. The phrase intrigued me with its unlikely fusion of demotic and 
 surrealistic. For nearly twenty years I wanted to use it as the title of something. During 
 those twenty years I heard it several times more – in Underground stations, in pubs, in 
 television plays – but always  from aged Cockneys, never from the young. It was a 
 traditional trope, and it asked to entitle a work which combined a concern with tradition 
 and a bizarre technique. The opportunity to use it came when I conceived the notion of 
 writing a novel about brainwashing. Joyce's Stephen Dedalus [in Ulysses] refers to the 
 world as an ‘oblate orange’; man is a microcosm or little world; he is a growth as organic 
 as a fruit, capable of colour, fragrance and sweetness; to meddle with him, condition him, 
 is to turn him into a mechanical creation. (qtd. in Aggeler 161) 
Burgess envisioned A Clockwork Orange as depicting a nightmarish near-future society, set in 
the 1970s. The reader is somehow left with the impression of England being the setting of the 
novel, although Burgess never specified it. While working on a draft for the novel, Burgess 
encountered a problem of stylistic nature. The story was to be told by Alex, a young thug of the 
future, in his own version of English, partly slang of his group, partly his own personal idiolect. 
Burgess saw no point in writing the novel in the slang of the early sixties, in the language of 
Mods and Rockers, as by the time the book was published, that slang would be long outdated. As 
this ephemeral quality of slang vernacular seemed like an insolvable problem, Burgess decided 
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to put the draft away. A year later, in the summer of 1961, Burgess set about relearning Russian; 
while doing so, it occurred to him that he had found a solution for the stylistic predicament of A 
Clockwork Orange: ‘the vocabulary of my space-age hooligans could be a mixture of Russian 
and demotic English, seasoned with rhyming slang and gipsy’s bolo’ (You’ve Had Your Time 
37). The name of the teenage dialect would be nadsat, the Russian suffix denoting –teen. 
 The core of the nadsat language, the ingenious invention of Burgess, is a vocabulary of 
two hundred or so Russian loanwords. There is nothing random about Burgess’ choice of words 
that make up nadsat – all of them work perfectly well in English, either as poetry or humour 
(Morrison x). For that reason, although reading the novel does require some puzzle solving, the 
meaning of nadsat words is often apparent from the context. There is no need to consult a 
dictionary while reading the book; in fact, Burgess strongly opposed the publisher’s suggestion 
to provide a glossary along with the novel. Burgess intended his book, which had brainwashing 
as its main focus, to be a brainwashing device itself: by the end of the novel the reader is to be 
conditioned into learning minimal Russian. Burgess explains that the book was intended as an 
‘exercise in linguistic programming, with the exoticisms gradually clarified by the context’ 
(You’ve Had Your Time 38). 
 Burgess chose to draw from Russian language primarily for linguistic reasons, claiming 
that Russian loanwords fit much better in English, than, for instance, German, Italian, or French. 
In addition, Burgess appreciated certain limitations of Russian vocabulary, which does not 
distinguish between leg and foot, using noga for both, or between hand and arm, which are alike 
ruka. According to Burgess, these limitations ‘would turn my horrible young narrator into a 
clockwork toy with inarticulated limbs’ (You’ve Had Your Time 38). The choice of Russian 
language conveys certain ironies as well: ‘And there was a fine irony in the notion of a teenage 
race untouched by politics, using totalitarian brutality as an end in itself, equipped with a dialect 
which drew on the two chief political languages of the age’ (You’ve Had Your Time 38). Quite 
ironically, Dr Branom, whose job is brainwashing, suggests that the nadsat language is the 
evidence of Russians having brainwashed the revolted youths. Aggeler interprets the Russian 
based nadsat language as a parody of the Western obsession over the potential influence of 
Communist propaganda on the capitalist youths (182). According to Sisk, the usage of Russian 
adds to the dystopian setting of the novel: ‘The Russian words do what French or Arabic cannot 
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accomplish by conveying an atmosphere of oppressiveness, a feeling of curtailed freedom and 
the fear of a too powerful State’ (66). 
 In his analysis of nadsat, Morrison concludes that in addition to Russian loanwords, 
nadsat includes often repetitions (‘creech creech creeching away’), the Shakespearean and 
Biblical English (‘Oh my father ... Fear not. He canst taketh care of himself, verily’), the 
abundant use of ‘like’ (‘Then there was like quiet and we were full of like hate.’), and coinages 
derived from slang (cancers are cigarettes, pretty polly is money) (x). Nadsat is infused with 
ambiguity, as Burgess believed the more layers of meaning, the better. As an example of how a 
variety of possible readings can be assigned to a single word, Aggeler analyses rabbit, nadsat 
word for ‘work’ (171). The word owes something to Russian rabotat meaning ‘working’, but 
also suggests Slavic rab, meaning ‘slave’; it also carries equally echoes of English words robot, 
‘mechanical slave’, and rabbit, suggesting someone who is habitually meek and scared. All these 
connotations contained in nadsat word for ‘work’ reflect Alex’s attitude towards adults; although 
there is a law that compels ‘everybody not a child nor with child nor ill to go out rabbiting’(CO 
28), Alex considers one who does so to be as spiritless as a robot, a compliant slave. 
 The structural and the moral integrity of the novel is just as carefully constructed as the 
nadsat language. To begin with, the novel is divided into three sections, through which, as 
Robert K. Morris puts it, Alex is damned, purged, and resurrected. Morris interprets this tripartite 
structure as a reference to the falling-rising pattern of comedy or the rising-falling pattern of 
tragedy (57). Furthermore, each section consists of seven chapters, which is an implicit reference 
to Shakespeare’s seven ages of man. The total number of chapters rounds up to twenty one, 
representing thus a symbol of one’s official coming of age. The twenty first chapter, in which 
Alex puts his violent past behind him as an act of maturity, completes not only the structural 
integrity of the novel, but its moral integrity as well. Burgess saw no point in writing a novel that 
did not allow for the moral growth. 
 The society of A Clockwork Orange is dealing with ‘a youth culture in revolt, a corrupt 
police force, a government unable to govern’ (Morrison viii). The mayhem of the adolescent 
aggression eventually reaches such a peak that the government resolves to put an end to it by 
means of Pavlovian techniques of negative reinforcement. The above mentioned moral dilemma, 
whether an evil human being with free will is preferable to a good zombie without it, is spelled 
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out by Burgess at several points in the novel. These are specified by Robert K. Morris: a note of 
caution is sounded by a prison chaplain on two occasions, and on one occasion by F. Alexander, 
an advocate of the right of moral choice (66-67): 
 The question is whether a technique can really make a man good. Goodness comes from 
 within, 6655321. Goodness is something chosen. When a man cannot choose he ceases to 
 be a man. (CO 63) 
 It may not be nice to be good, little 6655321. It may be horrible to be good. . . . Does God 
 want goodness or the choice of goodness? Is a man who chooses the bad perhaps in some 
 ways better than a man who has the good imposed upon him? . . . A terrible terrible thing 
 to consider. And yet, in a sense, in choosing to be deprived of the ability to make an 
 ethical choice, you have in a sense really chosen the good. (CO 71) 
 You've sinned, I suppose, but your punishment has been out of all proportion. They have 
 turned you into something other than a human being. You have no power of choice any 
 longer. You are committed to socially acceptable acts, a little machine capable only of 
 good. . . . But the essential intention is the real sin. A man who cannot choose ceases to 
 be a man. (CO 115) 
Robert K. Morris argues that Burgess wishes to sharpen our awareness of the matter, by issuing a 
warning: ‘In a perfect society that has sapped our vitality for constructive choice, we are, 
whether choosing good or evil, zombies of one sort or another: each of us is a little clockwork 
orange making up the whole of one great clockwork orange’ (67).   
 In You’ve Had Your Time, Burgess testifies that a folksong that has phrase ‘wanting seed’ 
in its refrain served him as an inspiration for the title of The Wanting Seed. With the seed 
representing semen, Burgess deemed the song in question to be overtly erotic and the expression 
to be adequate for the novel that was to deal with the effects of humankind’s inability to restrain 
its reproduction urges (32). Burgess explains that he decided to deal with this subject matter 
influenced by the years spent living in the ‘pullulating East’. An additional incentive was the 
work of Thomas Malthus, which Burgess was re-reading for the purpose of writing a study for an 
American journal (You’ve Had Your Time 33). Thomas Malthus, a prominent scholar of the 
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eighteenth century, did not share the optimism of his contemporaries, who believed in the 
possibility of uninhibited development of the humankind that would lead to the establishment of 
utopian society. Mathus claimed that such continuous progress would be precluded by the 
dangers entailed in the population growth. A clearly dystopian view of humankind as incorrigible 
and non-perfectible that is present in Malthus’ reflections is a starting point for Burgess as well. 
 The future England described in the novel – ‘a peaceful world that had forgotten the arts 
of self-destruction’ (WS 61) – can pride itself on many achievements, such as the abolition of 
war and usage of scientific discoveries to better the life of the humankind: ‘we learned to predict 
earthquakes and conquer floods; we irrigated desert places and made the ice-caps blossom like a 
rose’ (WS 112). Although it appears that the humankind proved capable of conquering the nature, 
it is still incapable of restraining its most basic urges. Aggeler observes that the sardine-can 
society envisioned by Burgess is brought about by ‘man’s failure to deal realistically or 
responsibly with the main problem, which is his own procreative instinct’ (163). The 
overpopulation is the problem of the whole world, which no longer knows division into countries 
on the basis of ethnicity. The world of The Wanting Seed is organized into language groups. The 
three superpowers, English, Russian, and Chinese Speaking Unions (Enspun, Ruspun and 
Chinspun), deal with the problem as each sees fit. Stricter Ruspun and Chinspun apply the death 
penalty for the citizens who violate the family regulations laws. Enspun, with England as its 
core, is more liberal and lax. Reflecting on The Wanting Seed in his autobiography, Burgess 
acknowledges that he should not have chosen England as the setting for the novel that deals with 
population explosion, and that a more suitable choice would have been Calcutta or Bombay. 
Nevertheless, Burgess notes that this novel is ‘hypothetical fiction, and it was in order to import 
starvation from Africa and statutory family planning from China’ (You’ve Had Your Time 33).  
 The desperate government of The Wanting Seed resorts to desperate measures in order to 
put an end to the population growth: firstly, it promotes non-productive forms of sexual activity 
with the aim of reducing the birth-rate; secondly, it reinstates war in order to cleanse the society 
from those citizens who are not contributing to the common good. By entertaining possible 
solutions to the problem of a demographic catastrophe, Burgess criticizes the present-day society 
and its willingness to make any sacrifice necessary in order to satisfy the societal demands. The 
24 
 
sacrifices made by the citizens of The Wanting Seed include accepting the imposed inversion of 
the sexual norms and accepting to wage a war that is an end in itself.  
 While acknowledging that social norms regulating human sexual behaviour are flexible 
and ‘in a state of constant metamorphosis’ (Aggeler 165), Burgess nevertheless ridicules a trend 
he had observed among his contemporaries, that of a liberal sympathy towards the homosexuals. 
When asked whether he saw homosexuality as a metaphor for ‘the absurdity and grotesqueness 
of the modern world’, Burgess replied: ‘The manner in which homosexuality is on the increase: I 
mean, it’s actually fostered. It’s not purely biological thing; it’s fast becoming very interesting, 
very glamorous to be a homosexual, a kind of radical chic’ (Ingersoll, Earl G., and Mary C. 
Ingersoll, eds.  132). His treatment of the matter of human sexuality in The Wanting Seed, a 
novel that depicts a society in which homosexuality is the desirable norm, while the 
heterosexuals are discriminated against, has earned Burgess frequent accusations of being 
homophobic.  
 Considering the conflicts that took place during the mid-twentieth century, such as The 
Second World War or the Korean War, it is no wonder that in the early nineteen-sixties Burgess 
would reflect on the issue of war. A big part of The Wanting Seed is a condemnation of war and 
of the society that has come to terms with perceiving war as ‘ordinary, as necessary, as giving a 
sense of mythic identity, of national cohesion, supporting the military-industrial complex so 
necessary to global capitalism’ (Waterman 6): 
 ‘By “they” we mean the people who get fat through making ships and uniforms and rifles. 
 Make them and destroy them and make them again. Go on doing it for ever and ever. 
 They’re the people who make the wars. Patriotism, honour, glory, defence of freedom – a 
 load of balls, that’s what it is. The end of war is the means of war. And we are all the 
 enemy.’ ‘Whose enemy?’ ‘Our own. You mark my words. We shan’t be alive to see it, 
 but we’re in now for an endless war – endless because the civilian population won’t be 
 involved, because the war will be conveniently far away from civilization. Civilians love 
 war.’ ‘Only’, said Tristram, ‘presumably, so long as they can go on being civilians.’ 
 (WS 233) 
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3. The notion of cyclical history 
 
 Friedrich W. Nietzsche, one of the single most influential philosophers of the modern 
age, was the first one to question the self-confidence of the entire Western civilization. 
Throughout his entire opus, he consistently rejects the two traditions that have shaped the 
Western civilization the most: firstly, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and secondly, the rationalist 
tradition that had originated in the ancient Greece and had found a new authority in the scientific 
revolution of the Enlightenment Age. For Nietzsche, Christianity and modern science, the two 
prominent authority discourses in the Western tradition, are more alike than different. They both 
have a tendency to propose one-dimensional interpretations of the infinitely complex and 
extraordinary nature of the world, thus confining the individual within a limited field (Booker, 
Literature 36). Since both of these traditions rely heavily on a linear perception of history, in his 
determined assault on the legacy of the Western civilization, Nietzsche questions precisely the 
basic underlying rationale that the Western civilization was founded on – the notion of history as 
a continuing emancipation and progress of the humankind. Instead, Nietzsche proposes a cyclical 
model of history as eternal recurrence, according to which history is bound to repeat itself 
endlessly across infinite time. This model suggests that progress on a big scale is impossible. 
Although moving forward, due to the cyclical nature of history, the humankind is always 
inevitably brought back to its starting point. Such notion of history incorporates a pessimism that 
is characteristic for dystopian fiction. As Booker observes, precisely Christianity and modern 
science are two principal sources of utopian energy in the Western culture (Literature 34). 
Therefore, Nietzsche’s abandonment of the faith in progress and reason marks the transition from 
utopian to dystopian energy as the dominant mode in the modern literature as well. 
 Influenced by Nietzsche, Michel Foucault as well challenges the conventional concept of 
history seen as a unilinear process developing along a single path with no deviations. On the 
contrary, he suggests that history is to be understood as a perpetual change that unfolds in a cycle 
of radical jumps between essentially different modes of thought (Booker, Literature 24).  
 Anthony Burgess too rejects a linear understanding of history and entertains an 
alternative concept – a cyclical model, as found in the social criticism of Nietzsche and Foucault. 
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The philosophical phases that make up the ‘perpetual waltz’ of the cycle envisioned by Burgess 
are the Pelagian phase, the Augustinian phase, and the Interphase. This concept of cyclical 
history functions as a backbone of both Burgess’ dystopian novels – the unfolding of the phases 
of the cycle matches the development of the protagonists ‘as their lives crisscross in the 
alternating historic cycles’ (Morris 61). The tripartite structure of A Clockwork Orange and The 
Wanting Seed, far more clear-cut and explicit in the former than in the latter, is thus a reflection 
of the tripartite structure of Burgess’ cyclical model of history. 
 Robert K. Morris explains that this ‘philosophic rationale’ enables Burgess to trace down 
the origins of liberalism and conservatism in the Western culture, only to provide criticism of 
both (61). The optimism of the liberalism that trusts humankind to be fundamentally good and 
perfectible is, according to Burgess, derived from the Pelagian denial of the original sin. The 
pessimism of the conservative thinking and its insistence on humanity as basically sinful is 
derived from Augustinian denial of the Pelagian doctrine.  
 Aggeler traces the beginning of the ‘seminal debate’ to the fourth century, and elaborates 
in more detail on its origins (159 – 162). Augustine and Pelagius, ‘the venerable bishop-saint and 
the heretic monk’ (Morris 62), clashed over the issue of free will, each proposing a different 
interpretation of the original sin and divine grace. According to Augustine, the human nature is 
corrupt as a result of the original sin: humankind lacks goodness and freedom ever since 
voluntarily choosing to abandon the prelapsarian state of innocence. Therefore, it is impossible 
for any individual to lead a virtuous life without the interference of the divine grace. While 
Augustine taught that the original sin had left mark on the whole humankind, as it is ‘transmitted 
from parents to children throughout all generations through the sexual act (which, inevitably 
accompanied by lust, is sinful)’, Pelagius taught that ‘sin is continued in humankind only by 
force of habit, as it is a result of following the bad example of Adam’ (Morris 62). Pelagius 
rejected the orthodox doctrine of the original sin, proposing that ‘everything good and everything 
evil, is done by us, not born with us’ (qtd. in Aggeler 159). He disputed the necessity of the 
divine grace arguing that an individual can earn salvation by exercising free will in a morally 
responsible way.  
 Aggeler observes that the fundamental issue in the debate is that of the human nature, 
concluding that ‘the diametrically opposed assumptions of Augustine and Pelagius could be 
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taken as premises of diametrically opposed political philosophies as well as attitudes toward 
social progress as far removed as hope and despair’ (161). The same is explained by Tristram 
Foxe, the protagonist of The Wanting Seed:  
 He denied the doctrine of Original Sin and said that man was capable of working out his 
 own salvation ... What you have to remember is that all this suggests human 
 perfectibility. Pelagianism was thus seen to be at the heart of liberalism and its derived 
 doctrines, especially Socialism and Communism ... Augustine on the other hand, had 
 insisted on man’s inherent sinfulness and the need for his redemption through divine 
 grace. This was seen to be at the bottom of Conservatism and other laissez-faire and non-
 progressive political beliefs. (WS 10) 
Pelagius' confident outlook on the potential of the humankind supports the belief that the 
fundamental goodness in people will inevitably guide them to achieve desirable social goals. 
According to Aggeler (162), stripped down of theology, Pelagianism becomes Rousseauvism, 
i.e. liberalism. On the other hand, Augustinianism incorporates a lack of confidence in human 
nature and a perception of an individual as ‘an uncooperative and selfish creature, not much 
concerned about the progress of the community’ (WS 11). Therefore, Aggeler continues, 
Augustinianism without theology is Hobbism, i.e. conservatism. Aside from Rousseau and 
Hobbes, as representatives of Pelagian and Augustinian principles respectively, many more 
scholars have contributed to the debate throughout the history. Aggeler names some of the most 
notable spokesmen of both the Augustinian and the Pelagian doctrine. The former group includes 
Luther, Calvin, Jansen, Pascal, Racine, Hobbes, and Swift, while the latter group includes 
Shaftesbury, Hume, Rousseau, Jefferson, Marx, Hegel, John Stuart Mill, Edward Bellamy, and 
majority of English and German romantic poets (161).  
 While the nature of the cycle can only be inferred from A Clockwork Orange, The 
Wanting Seed offers the most comprehensive and the most explicit elaboration of Burgess’ 
model of history perceived as a cyclical oscillation between Pelagianism and Augustinianism. 
The course of the cycle is presented to the reader by Tristram Foxe, a historian and a protagonist 
of The Wanting Seed. Tristram’s explication of the cycle conveniently starts with Pelagianism, 
since both A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed open with a depiction of a society 
undergoing a Pelagian phase. Benevolent Pelagians are guided by the belief that human nature is 
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perfectible, that the humankind strives to be perfect, and that that perfection can be attained by 
the efforts of the individuals: 
 The citizens of a community want to co-operate with their rulers, and so there is no real 
 need to have devices of coercion, sanctions which will force them to co-operate. ... Laws 
 point the way to an emergent pattern of social perfection – they are guides. But because 
 of the fundamental thesis that the citizen’s desire is to behave like a good social animal, 
 not like a selfish beast of the waste wood, it is assumed that the laws will be obeyed. 
 Thus, the Pelagian state does not think it necessary to erect an elaborate punitive 
 apparatus. (WS 17 – 18) 
The blind trust in ‘la volonté générale’ (Aggeler 163) demonstrated by the Pelagian government 
proves to be overbearing for the citizens, who, having their freedom of choice acknowledged, 
choose extreme violence, as the nadsat youths do in A Clockwork Orange, or irresponsible 
procreation, as do the citizens in The Wanting Seed. Faced with ‘compelling evidence that people 
are more selfish than the official credo dictates they should be’ (Aggeler 165), the governors 
react with disappointment and resolve to force the citizens into being good: ‘Disappointment 
opens up a vista of chaos. There is irrationality, there is panic. When the reason goes, the brute 
steps in. Brutality! ... Beatings-up. Secret police ... And all this because of disappointment. The 
Interphase’ (WS 19). The pattern is to be observed both in A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting 
Seed. Thugs – the nadsat youths in the former novel and the brutish ‘greyboys’ in the latter – are 
recruited into the police force in order to intimidate the citizens into obedience. As the Interphase 
progresses, the governors become taken aback by the excess of their reaction. They realize that 
they were misguided by ‘thinking in heretical terms – the sinfulness of man rather than his 
inherent goodness’ (WS 23). In effect, the government relaxes its sanctions, causing thus an utter 
chaos. 
 Unlike the disappointed Pelagians, the Augustinians find a ‘gloomy pleasure in observing 
the depths to which human behaviour can sink’ (WS 11). The Augustinians interpret the corrupt 
behaviour of the citizens as a confirmation of their conviction that the humankind is essentially 
sinful. They restore order, form a new government, and deal with social problems in accordance 
with their own understanding of human nature. As opposed to the liberal Pelagians, the brutal 
Augustinians, who expect no good from the humankind, do not concern themselves with the 
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individual rights or liberty. Instead, the Augustinian government seeks to provide stability for the 
society. As a way of ensuring that the choices of the individuals do not diverge from the societal 
demands, the Augustinian government in A Clockwork Orange employs behaviouristic 
engineering, while the one in The Wanting Seed implements a large-scale war of the sexes as a 
‘drainage system’. Witnessing the compliance displayed by the citizens, who are left with no 
choice other than to follow the rules of society, the governors acknowledge the possibility that 
people are perfectible. A new optimism thus emerges, which will eventually lead to the 
establishment of a new Pelagian phase.  
 The nature of the ‘perpetual waltz’ envisioned by Burgess is intriguing in the context of 
the opposition between utopian and dystopian thought, since Pelagianism is essentially utopian 
and Augustinianism is essentially dystopian. Burgess’ model of history may incorporate both the 
optimistic and the pessimistic phase; nevertheless, it is fundamentally dystopian. Firstly, since it 
is cyclical, Burgess’ model refutes the utopian faith in progress that is based on a linear 
understanding of human history. Secondly, observing the workings of the society across a 
complete course of the cycle enables Burgess to assert that the society is essentially hostile to the 
individual. Regardless of whether it is governed by ‘the Pelagian preoccupation with the tradition 
of liberty and the dignity of man’ or by ‘the Augustinian preoccupation with stability’, the 
society does not hesitate to ‘make any sacrifice for the good of man worthwhile, including the 
destruction of man himself’ (Aggeler 178). 
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4. Societal marginalization of the individuals who differ from the official norm 
 
 In On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), Nietzsche differentiates between two types of 
morality – master and slave morality. According to Nietzsche, the struggle between masters and 
slaves recurs throughout the history; therefore, to understand the idea of master-slave morality 
means to have the key to understanding the whole Western civilisation. On the one hand, master 
morality promotes nobility, pride, strength, open-mindedness, and straightforwardness. On the 
other hand, slave morality esteems exact opposites: weakness, compassion, meekness, and 
empathy. Master morality is the morality of the strong-willed, morality of sentiment. While 
masters were the ones to create morality, slaves only respond to it, with their own, slave 
morality. Slave-morality is thus a reaction to oppression; it is resentment – pessimistic and 
sceptical.  
 Nietzsche rails against Christianity because it has enabled the triumph of slaves over 
masters – he interprets the Biblical teachings of turning the other cheek, of meekness, charity, 
and compassion as intended to spread the predicament of the slave onto the whole humankind. 
The victory achieved by Christianity, of mediocrity over individualism, was consolidated even 
deeper into the tradition of the Western culture by the Enlightenment movement. Much of the 
Enlightenment movement was governed by the principles of egalitarianism, which promotes the 
belief that everyone is born with equal abilities and capacities and deserves equal opportunities. 
Nietzsche criticized such egalitarianism, claiming that there is a fundamental difference between 
those people who affirm life – the master-type, and those who deny life – the slave-type. 
Consequently, according to Nietzsche, any act of levelling out the society members is an act of 
violence against the human nature, since it forces the strong exceptional individuals to adjust to 
the mass of mediocrity. In other words, for Nietzsche, the advancement of democracy that took 
place during the Age of Enlightenment represents a collective relapse of humankind. Nietzsche 
asserts that the traditions that have shaped the Western civilization the most – the Judeo-
Christian tradition and democracy that ensued form the Enlightenment movement – favour the 
slave morality. 
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 A society that relies on the principles of the slave morality discourages any attempt of the 
exceptional individuals to distinguish themselves from ‘the herd’, a term Nietzsche uses to refer 
to common people who share the same mass psychology and are content with mediocrity; such 
master-type individuals are bound to be treated as outcasts. Influenced by Nietzsche, Freud and 
Foucault as well reflected on the causes of marginalization of the individuals who differ from the 
official norm. According to Freud, the society uses these individuals as scapegoats – they 
represent an outlet for the law-abiding citizens to manifest their aggression. In its collective 
aggression directed against the isolated individuals, ‘the herd’ is made even more compact: ‘It is 
always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are 
other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness’ (61). Foucault as well 
finds that the individuals who slightly differ from the official norm are exploited by the society – 
these individuals are excluded from the societal life, so that the society could define itself against 
such marginal group by exclusion (Booker, Literature 26). A similar fate awaits the protagonists 
of A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed. 
 Alex is the fifteen-year-old protagonist of A Clockwork Orange, appallingly ferocious 
and consciously evil, nonetheless innocently likable. Instead of keeping him at a safe distance, 
Burgess allows Alex to be the one to tell his story. Alex presents himself as ‘Your Humble and 
Suffering Narrator’, and intimates and allies closely with the readers, whom he addresses as his 
‘brothers and only friends’. As the narrator, he manages to distinguish himself vividly from the 
society he despises. The same society is trying to cope with adolescent violence as its major 
problem, Alex being the infamous embodiment of that phenomenon: ‘Everybody knows little 
Alex and his droogs. Quite a famous young boy Alex has become’ (CO 50). An undisputed 
leader of his friends in violence, Alex displays a solemn commitment to violence. ‘Too brutal to 
be wholly sympathetic and too strong to be a victim’, nonetheless, ‘like many a rebel-hero, he 
exudes diabolic charm’ (Morrison xii). 
 Possible interpretations of Alex’s name are numerous. Standing for either Alexander or 
Aleksei, it could equally suggest either English or Russian identity. If interpreted as Alexander, 
our protagonist is ‘the defender of men’, quite ironically as almost each of his interactions with 
others is an extortion of some sort of violence. On the other hand, he is a defender of what is 
human, in a sense that he epitomizes one of the most fundamental of human rights, that of the 
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freedom of choice. Further on, the combination of the negative prefix ‘a’ with the word ‘lex’, 
suggests at the same time lawlessness and wordlessness. While the notion of an absence of law is 
easily recognizable in Alex’s behaviour, the notion of a lack of words is far more subtle and 
harder to comprehend. Alex seems to be a competent narrator, ‘whether he happens to be 
snarling at his droogs in nadsat or respectfully addressing his elders in Russianless English’ 
(Aggeler 173). Geoffrey Aggeler elaborates on the matter: 
 He is articulate but ‘wordless’ in that he apprehends life directly, without the mediation 
 of words. Unlike the characters who seek to control him and the rest of the society, he 
 makes no attempt to explain or justify his actions in terms of abstract ideals or goals such 
 as ‘liberty’ or ‘stability’. Nor does he attempt to define any sort of role for himself 
 within a large social process. Instead, he simply experiences life directly, sensuously, 
 and, while he is free, joyously. (173) 
His direct, unmediated, and unpremeditated experience of life is one respect in which Alex 
differs from the rest of the society. Alex sees no point in reflecting on one’s actions in terms of 
causes or consequences, since he acknowledges that both goodness and evil are natural parts of 
every human being; each individual, as an autonomous agent, is to choose between good and 
evil. Alex is aware that the society wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom of choice, since free 
will implies the possibility of citizens making choices that do not concur with what is considered 
to be common good. By depriving individuals of free will, the state deprives them of ‘the self’, 
of what constitutes being a human being: 
 But, brothers, this biting of their toe-nails over what is the cause of badness is what turns 
 me into a fine laughing malchick. They don’t go into the cause of goodness, so why the 
 other shop? If lewdies are good that’s because they like it, and I wouldn’t ever interfere 
 with their pleasures, and so of the other shop. And I was patronizing the other shop. 
 More, badness is of the self, the one, the you or me on our oddy knockies, and that self is 
 made by old Bog or God and is his great pride and radosty. But the not-self cannot have 
 the bad, meaning they of the government and the judges and the schools cannot allow the 
 bad because they cannot allow the self. And is it not our modern history, my brothers, the 
 story of brave malenky selves fighting these big machines? I am serious with you, 
 brothers, over this. But what I do I do because I like to do. (CO 31)  
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What intensifies Alex’s experience of life the most are the pleasures of music and violence. 
These are inseparably interrelated for Alex, who finds the same ecstasy in committing the acts of 
violence, as he does in listening to classical music. Alex is a passionate devotee of classical 
music such as Beethoven’s, Bach’s, and Mozart’s. As noticed by Morrison, the motif of music 
serves Burgess, a composer and a musician himself, to address the issue of whether high art is 
civilizing (xiii). At the time when Burgess was writing A Clockwork Orange there was an 
ongoing public discussion concerning the fact that men who ran Auschwitz read Shakespeare 
and Goethe and listened to Beethoven and Bach. Alex as well addresses the issue: 
 I had to have a smeck, though, thinking of what I’d viddied once in one of these like 
 articles on Modern Youth, about how Modern Youth would be better off if A Lively 
 Appreciation of the Arts could be like encouraged. Great Music, it said, and Great 
 Poetry would like quieten Modern Youth down and make Modern Youth more Civilized. 
 Civilized my syphilised yarbles. Music always sort of sharpened me up, o my brothers, 
 and made me feel like old Bog himself, ready to make with the old donner and blitzen 
 and have vecks and ptitsas creeching away in my ha ha power. (CO 32) 
Although Alex mocks the notion of art being humanizing, his love of classical music 
distinguishes him from his enemies. Unlike Alex, his enemies demonstrate a lack of good taste. 
Dr Brodsky, the government psychologist, chooses Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony to accompany a 
documentary on Nazis shown to Alex during his conditioning treatments. Alex is thus 
conditioned into relating classical music with violence, both of which as a result become a source 
of nausea and physical pain for him. The opposing liberals are no better either, since they also 
use classical music to torture Alex and force him to attempt suicide.  
 Beethoven’s Ninth becomes a dominant motif throughout the novel. Robert K. Morris 
explains that it is no coincidence that Alex’s favourite piece of music is precisely ‘the glorious 
Ninth of Ludwig van’ (CO 132), considering that this symphony was deemed ugly by the 
rigorous harmonic standards of Beethoven’s contemporaries, as it is rich in dissonances: 
 Alex's language is, in  its way, ugly, too; but place it alongside the bland and vapid 
 professional or everyday language of the doctors and warders and chaplains and hear how 
 hollow their language  rings. Burgess was out to show how sterile and devitalized 
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 language could become without a continuing dynamics behind it; how, in fact, the juice 
 had been squeezed from it; and how, contrarily, Alex emerges as something of a poet, 
 singing dithyrambs to  violence, but revealing through the terrifying beauty of his speech 
 the naked beauty of an uninhibited psyche. (69 – 70) 
The language that Alex uses is yet another feature that distinguishes him from the mainstream 
society. The nadsat language has several functions. Firstly, as already discussed, it acts as a 
brainwashing device. Secondly, it serves to disguise the actual content of Alex’s narration and 
distance the reader from the horrors being told. For charming as Alex may be, his narration is a 
sequence of one violent incident after another, such as beatings, rapes, and murders. Burgess 
could not allow for any undermining of Alex’s role as the protagonist of the novel and the 
symbol of freedom of choice. The musical and poetical quality of nadsat language is meant to 
distract the reader from the fact that the language Alex uses is undeniably related with the 
‘ideology of hatred and violence’ (Booker, Literature 98): ‘As there was much violence in the 
draft smouldering in my drawer, and would be even  more in the finished work, the strange new 
lingo would act a as kind of mist half-hiding the mayhem and protecting the reader from his own 
bear instincts’ (You’ve Had Your Time 38). The narration is most vivid, with the colourful 
expressions and musical rhythms of nadsat at their best, precisely when Alex speaks of violence. 
Morris concludes that ‘the ferocious and coarse, partly archaic, partly mod, neologic nadsat 
captures perfectly the violence and pace of incidents’ (57), while the use of the conventional 
English is adequate enough for relating incidents of Alex being brainwashed and stripped of 
personality. 
 Lastly, the nadsat language serves to interpret Alex’s position within the society. Any 
language is social by its nature, and is used by an entire group. Likewise, nadsat is used by the 
entire body of youths, referred to as nadsats. Booker interprets the usage of the nadsat language 
as an act of linguistic rebellion – by rejecting the official language of the society, nadsats reject 
the official ideology of that society as well (Literature 95). Nadsat, spoken only by a group of 
youths, strengthens the feeling of solidarity among the group members and unifies them in their 
resistance to the official authority. In this opposition between the revolted youths and the 
ordinary citizens, youths gain a significant advantage through the use of nadsat. While the 
ordinary citizens do not understand nadsat, Alex understands the conventional English perfectly 
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well, and is able to use it when circumstances require him to do so; as he notes, ‘I always used 
my gentleman’s goloss govoreeting with those on top’ (CO 62). This also testifies to the 
imaginative supremacy of Alex and the rest of the nadsat youths over the adults, who in return 
demonstrate a lack of imagination and linguistic flexibility by not understanding nadsat (Booker, 
Literature 97). 
 Nevertheless, as Booker points out, the nadsat language alienates the youths from the 
society (Literature 97). The greater the distance between them and the ordinary citizens, the 
easier it is for nadsat youths to extort violence and justify the crimes they commit. Likewise, 
since these youths do not even speak their language, the conventional English, it is easier for 
ordinary citizens to regard nadsats as not being part of their society, and for the authorities to 
rationalize, though equally brutal, still legal reactions to the cruel acts of violence of the nadsat 
youths. While ‘using their own language may increase the marginality of the nadsats to the 
society in which they live’, Booker concludes that ‘it does not make them entirely independent of 
that society’ (Literature 97). In the end, acknowledging the authority of the mainstream society 
or not, the nadsat youths still have to answer for their actions, as Alex ultimately does.  
 What distinguishes Alex the most from the rest of the social body is his understanding of 
the workings of the society. He recognizes the intentions of ‘the State’ to numb its citizens into 
compliance in order to ensure that the citizens will take on which ever the role the society has 
intended for them. Alex refuses to be subjected to such manipulations. The protagonists of The 
Wanting Seed as well demonstrate a capacity to identify the mechanisms of manipulation 
employed by the society. They possess an awareness of the cyclical nature of history and of the 
arbitrariness of the norms that regulate societal life. On the one hand, spouses Tristram and 
Beatrice-Joanna Foxe refuse to accept the way in which the society exploits this arbitrariness to 
reshape the lives of its citizens in accordance with the societal demands. On the other hand, 
Derek Foxe accepts the norms imposed by the society without questioning them. While Derek 
thrives, Tristram and Beatrice-Joanna are forced to struggle for their very existence. Waterman 
interprets the fate of the three protagonists of The Wanting Seed as follows: ‘Burgess seems to be 
presenting a sort of pessimistic cultural evolution, where the survivors are those who are best 
able to adapt to a society in constant transition, without asking themselves too many questions’ 
(4).  
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 Derek Foxe, ‘a consummate Machiavellian bureaucrat’ (Aggeler 168), is preoccupied 
solely with advancing his career. During the Pelagian phase, Derek accepts the official sexual 
norms and, although he is heterosexual, he demonstrates ‘the perfect mime of orthodox 
homosexual behaviour’ (Waterman 3). Derek’s flawless performance earns him a major 
promotion within the Ministry of Infertility; he becomes the Metropolitan Commissioner of the 
Population Police (the Poppol). During the Augustinian phase, when heterosexuality becomes a 
prerequisite for officials to advance their career within the Ministry of Fertility, Derek adjusts 
once again; he sheds the mask of being homosexual and starts a family with Beatrice-Joanna. 
Derek understands the cyclical nature of history and, due to his ability to adapt to the 
requirements of every phase of the cycle, he thrives during each phase. As Beatrice-Joanna 
observes, Derek is ‘not the sort of man who would let himself be ruined’ (WS 21). In the society 
that requires its citizens to abandon their ideals and to shape their behaviour and convictions in 
accordance with what the society deems desirable, Derek does only what is necessary to survive. 
 Unlike Derek, Tristram is unable to utilize his knowledge to his own advantage. Aggeler 
infers an irony from the fact that while Tristram is a historian and has the most complete 
comprehension of the cycles in which history progresses, he nevertheless remains helpless and 
unable to control his own destiny: 
 In one sense, he does illustrate the idea of Marx and Hegel that man's freedom depends 
 upon, indeed consists in, his awareness of some inevitable historic process. In another, he 
 contradicts these great Pelagians who saw in ‘man's’ growing awareness cause for 
 optimism. Tristram's awareness, which is large to begin with and increases considerably, 
 gives neither him nor us much cause for optimism since it leads him only to foresee 
 endless repetitions of the cycle and no static millennium. (168) 
Another irony is implied in Tristram’s given name, that of the ‘nonheroic quality of this future 
age’ (Aggeler 167). Aggeler compares Tristram Foxe to ‘Tristram of the old’, concluding that the 
irony lies in the diametrically opposed fortunes of the two:  
 Like Tristram of old, he embarks on a quest that carries him throughout much of 
 England, but there the resemblance ends. Instead of cuckolding his uncle, he is himself 
 cuckolded by his brother. Instead of hacking and thrusting his way to immortal martial 
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 glory, he has the distinction of being the only soldier to escape an extermination session 
 and entombment as canned meat’ (167 – 168). 
Tristram’s misfortune is a result of his unwillingness to adapt to the societal demands. For 
instance, Tristram finds the sexual norms imposed by the Pelagian government to be unnatural, 
which holds him back in his professional life. Tristram was in line for a promotion to the chair of 
the History Department in the school where he teaches, but he is deemed not suitable for the job 
because he is heterosexual. The school principal stresses that, although getting married and 
having children is not against the law, ‘The best people just don’t. Just don’t’ (WS 30). 
Candidates considered more suited for the position are those who comply with the new sexual 
norm: ‘Wiltshire’s homo. Cruttenden’s unmarried. Cowell’s married with one kid, so he’s out. 
Crum-Ewing’s gone the whole hog, he’s a castrato, a pretty strong candidate. Fiddian’s just 
nothing. Ralph’s homo –’ (WS 31).  
 Tristram’s fortune does not change with the change of the government. The Augustinian 
government orchestrates a large scale war in order to fight the issues of overpopulation and of 
hunger. Tristram realizes that the war they are about to wage is a theatrical war, with no real 
enemy. Since intellect and sound judgement are not the qualities the society of The Wanting Seed 
esteems in an individual, Tristram is sent off to a staged battlefield to take part in an 
extermination session. Tristram’s fate seems to testify to the fact that ‘sanity is a handicap and a 
liability if you’re living in a mad world’ (WS 151). 
 Much like her husband, Beatrice-Joanna as well is greatly disturbed by the inversion of 
the sexual norms imposed by the society. Burgess assigns Beatrice-Joanna with a traditional role 
of a wife and a mother, making her thus a critic of the current social situation: 
 She was a handsome woman of twenty-nine, handsome in the old way, a way no longer 
 approved in a woman of her class. The straight graceless waistless black dress could not 
 disguise the moving opulence of her haunches, nor could the splendid curve of her bosom 
 be altogether flattened by its constraining bodice. Her cider-coloured hair was worn, 
 according to the fashion, straight and fringed; her face was dusted with plain white 
 powder; she wore no perfume, perfume being for men only – still, ..., she seemed to glow 
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 and flame with health and, what was to be disapproved strongly, the threat of fecundity. 
 There was something atavistic in Beatrice-Joanna. (WS 6) 
Beatrice-Joanna, ‘still a creature of instincts, after all these years of education and slogans and 
subliminal film propaganda’ (WS 42), rebels against the society she scorns. In the society that 
promotes non-productive forms of sexuality, her act of rebellion is her pregnancy. Booker 
explains that this pregnancy is politically sensitive for several reasons (Literature 92). Firstly, 
since it is Beatrice-Joanna’s second pregnancy, it represents a violation of the population 
regulation laws. Secondly, it involves a highly placed governmental official who publically 
presents himself as a homosexual – her brother-in-law Derek, with whom she is having an 
extramarital affair. In this respect, Beatrice-Joanna’s name reveals an allusion to her namesake, 
the heroine in Thomas Middleton's play The Changeling:  
 The term changeling can refer to a child or thing substituted by stealth, especially an elf 
 child left by fairies. Derek, the Machiavellian pseudofairy, unintentionally impregnates 
 his sister-in-law and thereby substitutes his own offspring for Tristram's child, whom she 
 has recently lost. (Aggeler 168) 
The chaos that pervades the relationships between the three protagonists – Tristram, Beatrice-
Joanna, and Derek – is not only a consequence of their own personal choices but also a reflection 
of the changes that are affecting the society. The animosity between Tristram and Derek is a 
result of the state’s efforts to promote fraternity hostility, ‘as an aspect of the policy of 
discrediting the whole notion of family’ (WS 48), while the deterioration of the relationship 
between the Foxe spouses is brought about by the death of their only child, a doing of a state that 
is desperate in its efforts to reduce the population growth. 
 The protagonists of A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed – Alex, Tristram, and 
Beatrice-Joanna – refuse to renounce their free will and to settle for the illusion of alternative 
offered by the society. They exercise their free will regardless of whether their behaviour is in 
accordance with what the society deems desirable. Burgess does not justify the transgressions 
committed by his protagonists, nor does he question the right of those governing the society to 
sanction these transgressions appropriately. However, Burgess disputes the right of those 
governing the society to degrade its citizens into anything less than human beings by depriving 
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them of freedom of choice. In his essay ‘Clockwork Marmalade’, Burgess emphasises that ‘if we 
are going to love mankind’, we have to love its ‘unrepresentative members’ as well; however, 
‘towards that mechanism, the state, which, first, is concerned with self-perpetuation and, second, 
is happiest when human beings are predictable and controllable, we have no duty at all, certainly 
no duty of charity’ (qtd. in Aggeler 182). 
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5. The animosity of societal mechanisms towards the individual  
 
 Freud’s theory of the conflict between the society and the individual, presented most 
comprehensively in Civilization and its Discontents (1930), is based on the premise that all 
humans have certain instincts that are innate and immutable. The most distinctive ones are desire 
for sex and tendency for aggressive behaviour towards authority figures and sexual competitors. 
While individuals are inevitably on a personal quest to satisfy their instinctual desires, the task of 
the society is to ensure conformity by restraining those very instincts. Inability of individuals to 
satisfy their instinctual desires will inevitably result in feelings of anxiety or discontent.  
 Freud emphasises the paradoxical aspect of the society. On the one hand, the humankind 
established the society believing that civilized life, as opposed to a primitive one, would alleviate 
human suffering and provide security. On the other hand, the security provided by the society 
comes at the cost of individual’s happiness. Freud concludes that ‘the essence of society lies in 
the fact that the members of the community restrict themselves in their possibilities of 
satisfaction’ (42). The society is not interested in securing happiness for its citizens, but 
providing security through a joint authority, which restrains individuals’ instincts, thus limiting 
their liberty. Freud concludes that the society is inimical to the most basic human desires since 
its sole purpose is to limit the individual’s liberty.  
 Foucault as well perceives the society as interested primarily in achieving stability by 
means of limiting the liberty of its citizens. In fact, in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (1975), Michel Foucault asserts a prison-like nature of the modern society. Exploring the 
transformation of the society over centuries, Foucault concludes that throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century there was a gradual shift ‘from a schema of exceptional discipline to one 
of a generalized surveillance’ (209). These mechanisms of surveillance have spread throughout 
the entire social body, and eventually have formed the disciplinary society. Foucault emphasises 
that disciplines are not to be understood as institutions or tools. Disciplines are methods of 
training individuals, meant to integrate the citizens into the general demands of society. 
Disciplines are a type of power, a mode for exercise of power; they regulate movements and 
clear up confusion (215).   
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 Influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault traces the causes of the development of the 
surveillance society to the Age of Enlightenment. He asserts that ‘the Enlightenment, which 
discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines’ (222). Foucault concludes that the modern 
society is carceral in its nature, noting that there is little difference between life inside and 
outside a prison; the modern prisons resemble modern factories, schools, hospitals, which all, in 
turn, resemble prisons. Both inside and outside a prison, the individual is subjected to constant 
surveillance, observed and examined at all times. In other words, the whole modern society, as 
fundamentally disciplinary, has become one carceral system.  
 In A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed Burgess deals exactly with the two forms 
of instinctual behaviour that are identified by Freud as ‘the greatest hindrance to the civilization’ 
– aggressive and sexual behaviour (89). The former novel focuses on the issue of the adolescent 
violence, while the latter one explores the consequences of a population explosion. As the 
societies depicted in both novels attempt to remedy these issues, they reveal themselves as 
antagonistic to the individual. Both societies employ mechanisms of manipulation in order to 
deprive the citizens of their free will, and thus preclude them from making choices that are not in 
accordance with the common good. Indeed, as anticipated by Foucault, the life of a law-abiding 
citizen of both the societies of A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed does not differ much 
from a carceral existence. 
 At the beginning of A Clockwork Orange, the political party in power is governed by the 
liberal Pelagian ideals. The enormous amount of crime taking place can be contributed, to some 
extent, to the excessive permissiveness of the society. Although it seems that Alex’s actions are 
an expression of his free will, Morris argues that Alex’s choice of evil is partially conditioned. 
Morris interprets Alex’s behaviour as ‘the gross product of welfare state overkill’, asserting that 
Alex is not ‘depraved because he is deprived’, but because he is indulged (70). Alex himself 
testifies to that: ‘I couldn't help a bit of disappointment at things as they were those days. 
Nothing to fight against really. Everything as easy as kiss-my-sharries’ (CO 12). The citizens as 
well interpret the adolescent brutality as a failure of the liberal methods of governing; they react 
with disappointment and seek a political change.   
 The change takes place during Alex’s imprisonment, as a new Minister of the Interior is 
elected, who is evidently leaning to Augustinian ideals. He soon realizes that the citizens, 
42 
 
intimidated by the adolescent brutality, are willing to sacrifice a portion of their liberty for a 
more peaceful life. The new government led by the Minister seeks to enforce order and stability, 
regardless of the means necessary. The Minister is actually not so much interested in suppressing 
the crime as he is in simply preserving the appearance of stability and order. He implements two 
policies in order to deal with two groups of criminals, those who are still on the streets and those 
who are imprisoned. The former group of the violent criminals is admitted into the police force. 
By turning the police force into a criminal body, the government is in fact encouraging violence, 
with the aim of contributing to the paranoia of the citizens, and ultimately achieving obedience 
through fear. The Minister relies on the modern behavioural technology to ‘cure’ the latter group 
so that they could be reintegrated into the society.  
 At the age of fifteen, after committing a murder in a robbery gone wrong, Alex is 
sentenced to fourteen years in prison, which he is to serve in Staja (State Jail Number 84F). The 
treatment of the prisoners there is aptly suggested by the name of the prison, as staja in Slavic 
languages denotes ‘stables’. Here Alex is reduced to a number, a part of statistics – ‘I was 
6655321 and not your little droog Alex not no longer’ (CO 57). Having a record of extremely 
brutal crimes, Alex is chosen to undergo an experimental conditioning treatment that will enable 
him to live the rest of his life as a submissive citizen. From the standpoint of the government 
officials, the treatment, called Ludovico Method as a play on Beethoven’s first name, is highly 
effective, as indeed it renders Alex incapable of contemplating crime, let alone committing one. 
The procedure conditions Alex’s body into associating the sight or thought of violence with 
unpleasant sensations, such as excruciating nausea and headaches. Having lost his capacity to 
choose what is deemed harmful by the society, Alex is considered to be rehabilitated. Now that 
he is ‘ready to turn the other cheek, ready to be crucified rather than crucify, sick to the heart at 
the thought even of killing a fly’ (CO 96), Alex is free to re-enter society as its harmless and 
helpless member, and as a living proof that the government, as it is dedicated to resolving social 
evils, deserves to be re-elected at the upcoming election.  
 Whilst the terms Pelagian and Augustinian are not mentioned explicitly in A Clockwork 
Orange, the representatives of both doctrines can be detected on the grounds of their opposing 
stands on adolescent brutality as the major social problem – the Minister of the Interior embodies 
Augustinian principles, while the Pelagian liberalism is embodied in F. Alexander’s political and 
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philosophical ideals (Aggeler 176). F. Alexander and Alex represent each other’s mirror-images; 
as opposed to Alex, who acts on impulse, F. Alexander is an ‘intelligent type bookman type’ 
(CO 18). Troubled by the accounts of the violence that takes place on the city streets, he analyses 
them only in terms of theoretical concepts, and from the safety of his cottage house. Able to 
think only in broad categories, F. Alexander finds it difficult to focus on particularities. For 
instance, when he finds Alex beaten up by the police, F. Alexander perceives him only as an 
abstract ‘victim of the modern age’ (CO 113). It is ironical that the same place where Alex now 
seeks mercy is the place where Alex’s most brutal crime took place. F. Alexander, once Alex’s 
victim, is now to act as his saviour.  
 Prior to his imprisonment, Alex and his gang broke into a cottage of ‘a gloomy sort of a 
name’ (CO 17), as Alex comments on the inscription on the cottage gate saying ‘HOME’. In the 
cottage they found F. Alexander and his wife. After beating them up most brutally, Alex forced 
F. Alexander to watch four of them rape his wife. His wife’s death, a consequence of the ‘ultra-
violence’, as nadsat youths refer to rape, caused F. Alexander to dedicate his life to fighting the 
evils of the modern age. Interestingly enough, F. Alexander is the author of a book called A 
Clockwork Orange. As Alex picks up the manuscript and reads a section, the reader finds out 
what the book is about: ‘The attempt to impose upon man, a creature of growth and capable of 
sweetness, to ooze juicily at the last round the bearded lips of God, to attempt to impose, I say, 
laws and conditions appropriate to a mechanical creation, against this I raise my sword-pen’ (CO 
18). Morrison notices that through the character of F. Alexander, Burgess incorporated himself 
into the novel, creating thus an effect ‘of an endlessly receding mirror’ (xiv). Burgess and F. 
Alexander share more than just the novel of the same title and the same theme. In 1944, while 
Burgess was in Gibraltar, his wife Lynne was robbed and beaten in London by a gang of four 
American deserters, which caused her to suffer a miscarriage. Burgess suspected that her ill 
health and early death may have had something to do with the assault. 
 The comparison between Burgess and F. Alexander ends there. Burgess has been known 
to criticise the liberals, asserting that they claim that they want to improve the condition of the 
humankind, but they attempt to do so at the expense of the individual (Aggeler 177). The same 
tendency can be recognized in F. Alexander’s attitudes and actions. F. Alexander claims that he 
wants to help Alex, but remains indifferent to Alex’s predicament as a specific instance of social 
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injustice, perceiving him instead solely as an abstract ‘victim of the modern age’. It is noble from 
F. Alexander to hold firmly to his belief that an individual is ‘a creature of growth and capable of 
sweetness’, especially as he has witnessed first-hand what people are capable of. Nevertheless, 
he readily exploits Alex, who as well is ‘a creature of growth and capable of sweetness’ (CO 18).  
 Blaming the government for the youth aggression, and therefore for the death of his wife, 
F. Alexander seeks to discredit the ruling party sufficiently to have them lose the next election. 
Alex is to serve as a propaganda device against the current, Augustinian government: ‘What a 
superb device he can be, this boy. If anything, of course, he could for preference look even iller 
and more zombyish than he does. Anything for the cause’ (CO 120). The liberals wish to exploit 
Alex’s tragic story as a testimony to the dehumanizing effects of the governmental crime-
fighting methods. F. Alexander and his fellow Party members are so dedicated to ‘the Future and 
our Cause’ (CO 122) that they push Alex, ‘a martyr to the cause of Liberty’ (CO 121), into 
attempting suicide, believing that Alex would be even more damaging as a dead witness to the 
horrors committed by the government than he would have been alive.  
 The ample negative publicity that was created by Alex’s attempted suicide motivates the 
Minister, pragmatic above all, to act. The behaviouristic engineers intervene, using ‘deep 
hypnopaedia or some such slovo’ (CO 130), to restore Alex’s capacity of moral choice. The 
Minister is content, as Alex’s case cannot discredit the government any longer. So is Alex 
because he once again experiences a thirst for both violence and classical music.  
 The final chapter reveals an image of a changed Alex. He has become tired of the throat 
cutting and the ‘old ultra-violence’, and came to realize that the gratification he had previously 
found in acts of brutality is now to be looked for elsewhere. Upon a chance meeting with a 
former gang member Pete, now married and settled down, Alex becomes aware of the change he 
has been undergoing, and is now able to articulate it: ‘I knew what was happening, O my 
brothers. I was like growing up’ (CO 140).  
 Through Alex’s reflections on his youth, Burgess once again implies that, like all 
members of society, Alex too has been conditioned long before being subjected to the 
governmental experiments, though in a more subtle manner. In order to highlight that 
brainwashing need not be obvious, David W. Sisk compares the image of Alex being strapped 
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onto a chair with his eyes held open during his ‘rehabilitation’ treatments, to the image of ‘starry 
bourgeois drinking in the gloopy worldcasts’ (CO 33). The two images contrast an unwilling 
viewer being forced to watch, with those who voluntarily pay attention. While the potency of the 
first image lies in its explicitness, the other image is just as alarming as it hints that conditioning 
is not necessarily conducted in a brute, overt manner (Sisk 62). Booker as well concludes that 
Alex and his fellow gang members have been subjected to such covert conditioning, as they ‘like 
everyone, have been exposed to a number of forming influences throughout their lives’ 
(Literature 95). Having realized this, Alex compares himself to a wind-up toy: 
 But youth is only being in a way like it might be an animal. No, it is not just like being an 
 animal so much as being like one of these malenky toys you viddy being sold in the 
 streets, like little chellovecks made out of tin and with a spring inside and then a winding 
 handle on the outside and you wind it up grrr grrr grrr and off it itties, like walking, o my 
 brothers. But it itties in a straight line and bangs straight into things bang bang and it 
 cannot help what it is doing. Being young is like being one of these malenky machines. 
 (CO 140) 
Burgess emphasises that instead of being treated as a wound-up clockwork mechanical toy, as a 
tool to be manipulated, each individual is to be treated as ‘an orange capable of growth and 
sweetness’. Burgess defends Alex’s human rights, but by no means does he justify or glamorize 
his brutalities. Every breach of the social contract should be adequately sanctioned; however, no 
transgression, even if of the magnitude such as Alex’s, provides an excuse for society to deprive 
individuals of the freedom of moral choice, as attempted in A Clockwork Orange. The solution is 
not to be found in transforming individuals into controllable and predictable citizens devoid of 
mind and free will. Geoffrey Aggeler suggests that the hope fundamentally lies ‘in the capacity 
of individuals to grow and learn by suffering and error’, as ‘suffering, fallen human beings, not 
behavioural technology or the revolutionary schemes of idealists, bring "goodness" into the 
world’ (181). In the end, Alex must choose to be good, which, ultimately, he does. 
 The Wanting Seed as well opens with a depiction of a society governed by the Pelagian 
ideals. Just as in A Clockwork Orange, in The Wanting Seed Burgess suggests that the major 
social problem, the population explosion, is partially a result of the Pelagian precarious 
46 
 
confidence in the humankind. The laxness of Pelagianism allows the citizens to exercise their 
free will to the point of populating themselves out of existence (Morris 61). In a severely 
overpopulated world, the Pelagian government attempts to remedy the predicament of its own 
doing. The government exercises economic and social pressure, differently within different 
classes, with the aim of reducing the birth-rate. 
 Among the governing class, the government encourages homosexuality by making ‘a life 
of blameless sexlessness’ (WS 27) the sole condition for advancing one’s career and thus one’s 
social and economic position: 
 ‘Now, I know this sounds crazy, but what gets a man a job these days is not pry-merrily 
 qualifications. No. It isn’t how many degrees he’s got or how good he is at whatever he 
 does. It’s – and I’m using the  term in its most general sense – his family background ... I 
 don’t mean whether your family was up in the world,’ he said. ‘I  mean how much of it 
 there is. Or was.’ He twitched. ‘It’s a matter of arithmetic, not of eugenics or social 
 status.’ (WS 29) 
Tristram and Derek Foxe may have the same family background; nevertheless, Tristram does not 
get a well deserved promotion due to the ‘aura of fertility’ that surrounds him, while Derek is 
highly placed since ‘being homo wipes out all other sins, the sins of the fathers’ (WS 77).  
  The government uses propaganda and education to turn homosexuality into the norm. 
The Ministry of Infertility, in charge of propaganda, leads a publicity campaign. Posters, 
‘showing, in ironical nursery colours, an embracing pair of one sex or the other’, featuring 
slogans such as ‘It’s Sapiens to be Homo’ and ‘Love your Fellow-Man’, are doings of the 
Ministry (WS 6). The Ministry advertises day and evening classes on how to be a homosexual, 
offered at the ‘Homosex Institute’. Education is as well exploited by the government with the 
aim of enforcing more desirable sexual codes. Teachers are expected to teach the acceptable 
version of history, not necessarily the correct one. 
 Aggeler notices that the government is stricter in insisting on the homosexual norm for 
members of the governing class, since ‘the Pelagian leaders share Malthus's belief that the 
educated classes can be persuaded by reason to act for the common good while the proletariat 
cannot’ (164). Recognizing that the working class cannot be reasoned with into accepting the 
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new sexual codes, the government allows for heterosexual families to exist, though limited to 
one birth per family: ‘Alive or dead. Singleton, twins, triplets. It makes no difference’ (WS 29). 
However heterosexuality is to be reserved solely for the members of the working class, since it is 
believed that ‘the job of breeding’s best left to the lower orders’ (WS 30). For that reason 
Beatrice-Joanna is reprimanded for her pregnancy: ‘Try to be modern. An intelligent woman like 
you. Leave motherhood to the lower orders, as nature intended... You’ve had your recommended 
ration. No more motherhood for you. Try to stop feeling like a mother’ (WS 5).  
 While within the governing class the government promotes homosexuality as a 
precondition for acquiring a better social position, within the working class the government 
exercises economic pressure more bluntly. The state encourages infanticide and rewards it in a 
form of financially expressed condolences. A benefit is paid to parents who kill their children 
and make an effort to present the death as an accident:  
 ‘Got sort of sufflicated in the bedclothes. Only three weeks old to the day he was, too.’ 
 ‘Scalded, mine was. Pulled the kettle right on top of him.’ The speaker smiled with a sort 
 of pride, as though the child had done something clever. ‘Fell out of the window, he did. 
 Playing, he was.’ ‘Money comes in handy.’ ‘Oh, yes, that it does’. (WS 20) 
In fact, as a means of reducing the population, the governmentally sponsored health system does 
nothing to save lives of seriously ill children. The families are not even allowed to organize a 
conventional funeral for their departed ones, since each corpse is to be handed over to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, in order to serve as fertilizer. The official stand is that each death is to 
be seen in global terms: ‘One mouth less to feed. One more half-kilo of phosphorus pentoxide to 
nourish the earth’ (WS 4). 
 However, ‘education and propaganda and free contraceptives, abortion clinics and 
condolences’ (WS 43) prove to be ineffective measures as they fail to manipulate the citizens into 
restraining their reproduction urges. In effect, the society witnesses further increase in population 
and further dehumanization of everyday life. 
 As a result of an ongoing power struggle on the political scene, the conservative 
Augustinians take over the government, after which they implement more radical methods in 
order to solve the problem of overpopulation and achieve social stability; they see a large scale 
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war of the sexes as the solution. The war is expected to function primarily as ‘the controller, the 
trimmer and excisor, the justifier of fertility’ (WS 235), as a social drainage system that can 
reduce the population in an organized, efficient, and, according to the government, a humane 
manner: ‘Everybody has a right to be born. But, similarly, everybody’s got to die sooner or later 
... and history seems to show that the soldier’s death is the best death’ (WS 278). By getting rid 
the society of ‘the morons and the enthusiasts’, ‘the corner-boys and the criminals’, ‘the 
cretinous over-producers’, and ‘the ruffians, the perverts, the death-wishers’ the state is ensuring 
‘A safe and spacious community. A full house of happy people’ (WS 279).  
 The War Department that attends to the business of war is a privately owned corporation. 
The government and the civilians running the War Department are the only ones who know what 
kind of fate awaits the soldiers. In the society that has outlawed wars long ago, the civilians and 
the soldiers are generally ignorant of how a war is fought:  
 I meant, you know, fighting. Armies. One lot having a bash at another lot, if you see 
 what I mean. One army facing another army, like it might be two teams. And then one lot 
 shoots at another lot, and they go on shooting till somebody blows the whistle and they 
 say, ‘This lot’s won and this lot’s lost.’ Then they dish out leave and medals and the tarts 
 are all lined up waiting at the station. That’s the sort of war I mean, mister. (WS 197) 
Holding firmly to the belief that a soldier has no right to ask questions or express opinions, the 
government expects the soldiers to follow the orders blindly. Any incident of a soldier seeking 
more information about the causes of the war or identity of the enemy is met with annoyance of 
the members of the governing class: 
 The enemy is the enemy. The enemy is the people we’re fighting. We must leave it to our 
 rulers to decide which particular body of people that shall be... Why are we fighting? 
 We’re fighting because we’re soldiers. That’s simple enough, isn’t it? For what cause are 
 we fighting? Simple again. We’re fighting to protect our country and, in a wider sense, 
 the whole of the English-Speaking Union. From whom? No concern of ours. Where? 
 Wherever we’re sent. (WS 226) 
Trained in complete isolation from the rest of the population, soldiers are shipped off to carefully 
staged battlefields for extermination sessions: ‘Loud amplifiers. Magnesium flashes. Electronic 
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war, gramophony war’ (WS 248). In a typical session male and female armies destroy each other 
completely. Being able to think independently, past the government propaganda, Tristram sees 
through the charade and realizes that this war is a theatrical one. He manages to survive the 
extermination session, only to witness the horrors of the governmental methods of fighting the 
overpopulation: ‘It was slaughter, it was mutual massacre, it was impossible to miss... Three 
minutes from start to finish’ (WS 259 – 260). The remains, ‘lorry-loads of corpses’ (WS 248), are 
gathered up and processed for human consumption. The state reinforces an assumption held 
among the citizens that cannibalism, as long as it is conducted in a civilized manner, is socially 
acceptable: ‘It makes all the difference, if you get it out of a tin’ (WS 172). War thus proves to be 
a very efficient method of fighting the population increase. In addition to reducing the 
population, it also provides food for those citizens who are lucky enough not to be selected for 
the extermination sessions. 
 Pondering why the government forces its citizens to go through the charade of an 
orchestrated war, Tristram finally concludes: ‘Perhaps because we’ve a government that believes 
in everybody having the illusion of free will’ (WS 242). Indeed, in the society of The Wanting 
Seed, the only two choices that an individual is free to make are to be ‘persuaded to castrate 
himself, in one way or another’ and to be ‘eaten by a military/industrial complex’ (Aggeler 169). 
In the end, the choices made by the law-abiding citizens must at all cost concur with the common 
good – the social stability.  
 It may appear that A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed end optimistically. Upon 
reaching the adulthood, Alex grows beyond the vicious thug from the beginning of the novel and 
renounces violence. Tristram, having survived the extermination session, is free to rejoin the 
society as a civilian; he wishes to be reunited with Beatrice-Joanna, who as well has come to 
realize that it is Tristram, and not Derek, whom she loves. Nevertheless, Morris detects a 
continuing pessimism in the happy ending of each novel (57). Alex realizes that the generations 
to come will have to go through the same chaos of adolescence as he once did. Tristram observes 
the first signs of faith in human perfectibility that will inevitably lead to the transition from the 
current Augustinian phase to a new Pelagian phase. Alex’s and Tristram’s reflections suggest 
that there are no means of breaking out of ‘the dreary cyclic history’ (Booker, Literature 94): 
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 And so it would itty on to like the end of  the world, round and round, like some 
 bolshy gigantic like chelloveck, like old Bog Himself (by courtesy of Korova Milk-bar) 
 turning and turning and turning a vonny  grazhny orange in his gigantic rookers. 
 (CO 141) 
At the end of both A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed Burgess reminds the reader of the 
cyclical nature of history. Not intended to be understood literally, the rationale of cyclical history 
serves Burgess to reinforce a pessimistic outlook regarding the prospects of humankind’s 
progress towards achieving utopian society. Such dystopian pessimism is a result of 
understanding the mechanisms of society as inimical to the individual.  
 In order to demonstrate this animosity between the society and the individual, Burgess 
depicts societal life in ‘both sieges of the historic cycle’, using the terms of Pelagianism and 
Augustinianism merely as ‘avenues to moral blindness and collective insanity’ (Aggeler 182). 
By ridiculing the Pelagian and the Augustinian governments in A Clockwork Orange and The 
Wanting Seed, Burgess in fact criticizes the present-day doctrines of liberalism and conservatism. 
Both the optimistic liberals, who claim to be fighting for the liberty of the individual, and the 
cynical conservatives, who claim to be fighting for the stability of the whole social body, are 
governed in their struggle by such a narrow-minded understanding of the human nature that they 
‘leave little room for the uniqueness of individual men’ (Aggeler 183).  
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Conclusion 
 
 The first dystopian works found in the literary tradition of the Western civilization date 
back to the age of the ancient Greece, when Aristophanes wrote his satirical plays as a reaction to 
the utopian works of his contemporaries. Ever since, utopian and dystopian thought have been 
engaged in a sort of a literary dialogue. Through this dialogue, instead of merely seeking to 
discredit utopian thought, dystopian literature acts as a healthy opposition to the utopian ideals. 
In addition to warning against the potential abuses that might result from the attempts to 
implement utopian blueprints for perfecting the society, dystopian fiction critically observes the 
existing political and social practices. Authors of the dystopian fiction situate the observed 
shortcomings of the real-world societies always in a new, imaginary context, in order to provide 
the readers with an impartial perspective and enable them thus to recognize the inconsistencies 
and the injustices at work in the existing present-days societies. By doing so, dystopian literature 
undertakes the role of social criticism. 
 By dealing in A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed with the real-world society 
issues, such as the adolescent aggression and the consequences of irresponsible procreation, 
Burgess in fact explores the conflict between the individual freedom and societal demands, only 
to ascertain that the society is antagonistic to the individual. The societies of A Clockwork 
Orange and The Wanting Seed employ mechanisms of mind manipulation with the aim of 
ensuring a mechanical and unnatural functioning of the societal life. Such brute and inhumane 
mechanisms include conducting behaviouristic engineering and implementing a large scale war 
that is an end in itself. While Burgess somewhat exaggerates the manipulation mechanisms used 
by the societies of A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed, he does so only to demonstrate 
to which lengths the society is willing to go in order to achieve uniformity of opinion and 
behaviour among its citizens.  
 In the both novels, Burgess emphasises that the mind manipulation, which is intended to 
deprive the citizens of their free will and manipulate them into satisfying compliantly the societal 
demands, need not be conducted solely in an overt manner. Burgess implies that all the members 
of the society are subjected to a covert conditioning through the subliminal propaganda 
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distributed by the means of media or education. Burgess’ protagonists possess an understanding 
of the workings of the society and recognize that instead of the freedom of choice, the society 
will allow its citizens to have only an illusion of one. By refusing to play the roles that the 
society has intended for them, Burgess’ protagonists differ from the official norm, posing thus a 
threat to the society that seeks to maintain a predictable, controllable, and efficient community. 
Unwilling to let go what makes them human, the capacity to make their own choices, these 
distinctive individuals are marginalized and perceived by the mainstream society as delinquents. 
 Burgess acknowledges that, when given the opportunity to exercise their freedom of 
choice, it is in the human nature to choose what is wrong over what is right. Nevertheless, 
Burgess stands in defence of the individual and his/her freedom of choice and insists that while 
the transgressions against the social contract committed due individual’s exercise of free will are 
to be sanctioned, the sanctions should by no means include depriving the individual of the 
capacity to freely choose the course of their actions. The readiness of the society to deprive its 
citizens of free will and reduce them to mechanical toys, testifies to the fact that the society 
either has an inadequate understanding of the human nature, or is volitionally ignorant of it. In 
order to demonstrate that, Burgess entertains a model of cyclical history, which consists of three 
phases – the Pelagian and the Augustinian phase, with the Interphase as a transition between the 
two. Burgess traces the origins of liberalism and conservatism to the teachings of Pelagius and 
Augustine respectively, only to provide criticism of both doctrines. He concludes that regardless 
of whether it is governed by the liberal Pelagians, who perceive the humankind as essentially 
good and perfectible, or by the conservative Augustinians, who perceive the humankind as 
essentially corrupt and preoccupied solely with personal wellbeing, the society will employ 
mechanisms intended to manipulate the individual into fitting one of these preconceived 
understandings of human nature, denying thus the uniqueness of each individual. Burgess 
implies that the antagonism between the society and the individual stems precisely from the 
failure of the society to genuinely understand the human nature, which, according to Burgess, 
encompasses equally the both poles of the binary opposition, the goodness and the evil.  
 Through his dystopian novels, A Clockwork Orange and The Wanting Seed, Burgess 
articulates the contradiction that characterizes the relationship between the society and the 
individual. On the one hand, the necessary precondition for any individual to exercise freedom of 
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choice is to accept the social contract, since the freedom of choice cannot be exercised outside 
the civilized life. On the other hand, once the social contract is accepted and the society is 
established, the citizens are forced to renounce their free will so that the societal life could be 
governed in a predictable, controlled, and sterile manner. Burgess does not offer possible 
solutions for resolving this antagonism that pervades the relationship between the individual and 
the society. Instead, he leaves the reader with a rather grim thought: unless the humankind is 
willing to return to the chaos entailed in the unlimited freedom of the existence outside the 
civilized life, the only alternative left for the humankind is to accept that the stability offered by 
the societal life comes at the cost of freedom of choice.    
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